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Comment
Pleading Scienter Under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Did Congress
Eliminate Recklessness, Motive, and Opportunity?
Nicole M. Briski*

I. INTRODUCTION

Shareholders are filing federal securities fraud class action lawsuits in
record numbers.' The likelihood that a corporation will be the subject
of a shareholder class action lawsuit currently lies at 57.5%.2 From
December 22, 1995, to January 13, 2000, 737 companies were sued in
federal court. 3 Furthermore, companies in the high technology industry,
the most frequently sued industry, are particularly vulnerable to
shareholder lawsuits. 4 In Silicon Valley, the epicenter of this industry,
one out of every two corporations has been subjected to a securities
5
class action lawsuit.
* J.D. expected May 2001. I would like to thank my husband, David Leatherwood, for his
guidance, support, encouragement, and love.
1. See Cindy Krischer Goodman, Shareholders Find Benefits, Limits to Suing Firms When
Stock Price Plummets, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 3, 2000, at 2 (describing the recent increase in the
number of shareholder lawsuits filed); Kelly Greene & Carrick Mollenkamp, MedPartnersSettles
Suits By Investors, WALL ST. J., July 28, 1999, at FI (proclaiming that the number of shareholder
securities lawsuits in the Southeast is "skyrocketing"). In fact, in 1998, the number of securities
lawsuits filed in the southeastern states of Alabama, Florida, Tennessee, Georgia, South Carolina,
and North Carolina has increased six-fold from that of 1997. See Greene & Mollenkamp, supra,
at Fl.
2. See Goodman, supra note 1, at 2 (citing the National Economics Research Associates in
New York).
3. See Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (visited Jan. 12, 2000)
<http://securities.stanford.edu/>.
4. See id.; see also Richard A. Rosen, US Securities Litigation in a Time of Change, 18 INT'L.
FIN. L. REV. 1923, 1925 (1999) (remarking that "[t]he largest portion of the lawsuits are against
high technology companies"). Young, high technology companies are particularly vulnerable to
suits because they generally experience volatile stock prices. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 16
(1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 695.
5. See 141 CONG. REC. H15216 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fields).
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Once a securities fraud lawsuit survives a motion to dismiss, the
prohibitive cost of discovery 6 provides an incentive for a corporation to
7
settle the lawsuit, regardless of the company's culpability.
Approximately 93% of the securities class action lawsuits filed each
year settle, at an average cost of $8.6 million each.8 The high
settlement value of securities lawsuits has led to many abusive
practices, including the filing of frivolous litigation in the hopes of
surpassing a motion to dismiss and achieving a high settlement. 9 These
suits, termed "strike suits," 10 ultimately harm the shareholders of public
11
corporations who must bear the costs of settlements and attorney fees.
Additionally, "strike suits" harm the market because the suits hamper
corporate innovation and discourage corporations from releasing
information to the public. 12 The high settlement value associated with
securities class actions also encourages plaintiffs' attorneys to file
numerous suits on behalf of shareholders in the hopes that at least one
14
will succeed, 13 a practice known as "saturation bombing.'

6. See Robert J. Giuffra Jr., CEOs Beware: The Strike Suit Lives, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 1999,
at A45 ("Discovery costs account for about 80% of the total costs of securities class actions.").
During discovery, plaintiffs can require a corporation, "at great expense, to turn over hundreds of
thousands of pages of memos, e-mail and notes." Id. Additionally, key employees must spend a
significant amount of time responding to discovery requests, such as providing deposition
testimony. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 14 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 693.
7. See Giuffra, supra note 6, at A45; see also S. REP. No. 104-98, at 6 (1995), reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685 (noting that securities class actions "have a much higher settlement
rate than other types of class actions").
8. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 9 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 688.
9. See id.; see also 141 CONG. REc. H15215 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Bliley) (likening "strike suits" to extortion). Shareholders routinely file lawsuits immediately
after a company announces that its earnings have decreased. See Greene & Mollenkamp, supra
note 1, at 1; see also 141 CONG. REC. H15216 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Fields) (recognizing that many shareholders file lawsuits "only because the market price on the
securities has dropped"); Cindy Krischer Goodman, Lawyer King of Stock Fraud Suits: When
Prices Take Dramatic Fall, Shareholders Call Melvin Weiss, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 9, 2000, at 2
(noting that "[w]hen a company's stock drops precipitously, [shareholders' attorneys] often file a
lawsuit within days, sometimes hours").
10. Strike suits are defined as a "[sihareholder derivative action begun with hope of winning
large attorney fees or private settlements, and with no intention of benefiting [the] corporation on
behalf of which suit is theoretically brought." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1423 (6th ed. 1990).
11. See Giuffra, supra note 6, at A45; see also S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 5 (1995), reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 684 (explaining that "meritorious suits do not benefit when strike suit
artists wreak havoc on the Nation's boardrooms and courthouses").
12. See Giuffra, supra note 6, at A45.
13. See id.; see also H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 37 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 736 (likening discovery in a securities class action to a fishing expedition).
14. See Goodman, supra note 1, at 2 (defining "saturation bombing" as "filing enough cases
so that maybe one will pay off').
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Pleading Scienter Under the PSLRA

Because most securities class action lawsuits settle after the plaintiff
has survived a motion to dismiss, the pleading standard imposed on the
plaintiff's complaint is extremely important. 15 The weaker the standard,
the more likely frivolous lawsuits will reach settlement. 16 Conversely,
the more stringent the standard, the more likely that "strike suits" will
be eliminated at the pleading stage. 17 Prior to 1995, the federal circuit
courts that had addressed this issue disagreed on the requisite pleading
standard of securities fraud actions, namely the requirements that a
18
plaintiff had to meet when pleading scienter.
In an attempt to establish uniform pleading standards and reduce
frivolous litigation, the United States Congress enacted the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA").' 9 Every circuit
to address the issue has agreed that the PSLRA has heightened the
pleading standard for scienter that a plaintiff must meet in order to
withstand a motion to dismiss. 20 The circuits, however, disagree on the
appropriate standard to adopt for pleading scienter under the PSLRA. 2 1
Specifically, the circuits are split as to whether scienter under the
PSLRA encompasses recklessness or, rather, a deliberate and knowing
state of mind.22 Additionally, the circuits disagree on whether the

15. See Marc J. Sonnenfeld & Karen Pieslak Pohlmann, Circuit Courts Address Standardsfor
Pleading Scienter in Dismissing Complaints, 7 METRO. CORP. COUNS. 52, 52 (1999) (explaining
that the viability of "securities class actions can turn on the level of particularity that is required
and the types of allegations that suffice to aver scienter"); Giuffra, supra note 6, at A45 (stating
that "[t]he main check on strike suit-lawyers is the ability of a federal judge to throw out a flawed
complaint before discovery").
16. See Giuffra, supra note 6, at A45.
17. See id.
18. See infra Part II.A.3 (discussing the disparity among the circuit courts prior to 1995 as to
the applicable scienter pleading requirements). Scienter refers to "a mental state embracing intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U'S. 185, 194 n. 12 (1976).
19. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737,
758 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A.§ 78u4 (West 1997 and Supp. 2000)).
20. See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 193 (1st Cir. 1999); Phillips v. LCI Int'l,
Inc, 190 F.3d 609, 620-21 (4th Cir. 1999); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1283
(11 th Cir. 1999); In re Comshare, Inc., 183 F.3d 542, 552 (6th Cir. 1999); In re Silicon Graphics,
Inc., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999); In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d 525, 531-32 (3d Cir.
1999); Press v. Chemical Inves. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1999); Williams v.
WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1997).
21. See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 193-94; Phillips, 190 F.3d at 620; Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1287;
Comshare, 183 F.3d at 549; Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974; Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534-35;
Press, 166 F.3d at 538; Williams, 112 F.3d at 178; see also infra Part III (discussing the various
circuit courts' approaches to scienter and state of mind requirements).
22. See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 193; Phillips, 190 F.3d at 620; Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1287;
Comshare, 183 F.3d at 549; Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974; Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534-35;
Press, 166 F.3d at 538; Williams, 112 F.3d at 178; see also infra Part III.A (comparing the
standard of recklessness to deliberate recklessness).
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pleading of facts demonstrating the defendant's motive and opportunity
to commit securities fraud is sufficient to withstand a motion to
23
dismiss.
This Comment begins with a brief description of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5, which is a rule
24
promulgated thereunder by the Securities Exchange Commission.
Specifically, this Comment will examine the history of the scienter
requirement and the varied pleading standards adopted by the circuit
courts prior to the enactment of the PSLRA.25 Next, the Comment will
address the purposes behind the enactment of the PSLRA and trace the
legislative history of the PSLRA.26 This Comment will then discuss the
current disagreement among the circuits regarding the requisite state of
mind that must be pled under the PSLRA. 27 The Comment will then
further discuss the three different approaches adopted by the circuits
regarding a plaintiff's ability to withstand a motion to dismiss through
factual allegations that demonstrate the defendant's motive and
opportunity to commit securities fraud.2 8 Further, this Comment will
analyze the varied approaches to the pleading of scienter in light of the
PSLRA's rationale, legislative history and text. 29 Finally, the Comment
will propose that the PSLRA attempted to retain the severe recklessness
standard and eliminate the sufficiency of the bare pleading of motive
30
and opportunity.
II. BACKGROUND

Before examining the current disagreement among the circuits as to
31
the proper pleading standard for scienter in securities fraud litigation,

23. See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 193; Phillips, 190 F.3d at 620; Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1287;
Comshare, 183 F.3d at 549; Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974; Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534-35;
Press, 166 F.3d at 538; Williams, 112 F.3d at 178; see also infra Part III.B (discussing the various
circuit courts' requirements that a plaintiff must allege in order to survive a motion to dismiss).
24. See infra Part II.A. I (describing Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5).
25. See infra Parts II.A.1-3 (outlining the status of securities fraud before the PSLRA was
enacted).
26. See infra Part 11.B (discussing the PSLRA and its history).
27. See infra Part III.A (comparing the standard of recklessness to deliberate recklessness).
28. See infra Part III.B (discussing the varying interpretations of the circuits as to whether
pleading motive and opportunity alone satisfies the scienter pleading requirements).
29. See infra Part IV (analyzing the various circuit court approaches in the context of the text,
legislative history, and policies behind the PSLRA).
30. See infra Part V (proposing the Supreme Court intervene to clarify the correct standard
under the PSLRA).
31. See infra Part III (discussing the circuit courts' disagreement over the required state of
mind and level of specificity regarding scienter that a plaintiff must allege).
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it is important to understand federal securities laws and policies.3 2 First,
this section will discuss the status of securities fraud litigation prior to
the enactment of the PSLRA.3 3 This section will then examine the
rationale behind the enactment of the PSLRA and the PSLRA's
legislative history. 34 This section will conclude with a discussion of
legislation enacted subsequent to the PSLRA.35
A. Securities FraudPre-PSLRA
1. Section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
secondary trading of all securities. 36 Rule lOb-5,
thereunder by the Securities Exchange Commission,
important anti-fraud provision of the securities laws.3 7

regulates the
promulgated
is the most
Rule lOb-5

32. See infra Parts IIA-C (describing securities fraud before the PSLRA was enacted, the
PSLRA, and legislation following the enactment of the PSLRA).
33. See infra Part II.A (discussing securities fraud litigation prior to the enactment of the
PSLRA).
34. See infra Part II.B (discussing the PSLRA and its history).
35. See infra Part H.C (outlining securities fraud legislation enacted after the PSLRA).
36. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (West 1997); see also Paul
Vizcarrondo, Jr. & Andrew C. Houston, Liabilities Under Sections 11, 12, 15, and 17 of the
Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 10, 18 and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1138
PLI/Corp 583, 611 (1999) (explaining the applicability of Section 10(b)). Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78j.
37. See Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2000);
Vizcarrondo & Houston, supra note 36, at 611 ("[Section] 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 continue to
dwarf in importance other liability rules under the securities laws."). Rule 1Ob-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
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gives a purchaser or seller of securities a private cause of action for
securities fraud. 38 To state a cause of action under Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5, a plaintiff must plead that the defendant made a
misstatement or omission of a material fact in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities, upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied
and was injured. 39 In 1976, the Supreme Court held that scienter is an
essential element of a Rule lOb-5 cause of action.4 0 The Court defined
scienter as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud."'
The Court, however, declined to determine whether
42
recklessness satisfies the scienter definition.
2. Scienter Includes Recklessness
Since the Supreme Court concluded that scienter is a required
element under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in 1976, 43 each circuit
court to address the issue held that scienter encompasses recklessness.44
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5.
38. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731-32 (1975); see also
Vizcarrondo & Houston, supra note 36, at 611-12 (tracing judicial decisions that led to the
conclusion that there is an implied private cause of action for securities fraud under Rule 1Ob-5).
39. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1281 (1 1th Cir.
1999); Press v. Chemical Inves. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 534 (2d Cir. 1999); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
40. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 (holding that a private cause of action under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 necessitates the pleading of scienter). Scienter is defined as "a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud." Id. at 194 n.12. The Supreme Court
reasoned that the use in Section 10(b) of the terms manipulative or deceptive, used in conjunction
with device and contrivance "strongly suggest that § 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or
intentional misconduct." Id. at 197.
41. Id. at 194 n.12.
42. See id. The Court acknowledged that recklessness could at times amount to a type of
"intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability." Id. On the other hand, the Court held
that scienter under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 does not encompass negligent conduct. See id.
at 214.
43. See id. at 193.
44. See SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 641-42 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (recognizing recklessness as
a form of scienter in Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions); accord Backman v. Polaroid Corp.,
910 F.2d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 1990); Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569-70 (9th
Cir. 1990) (en banc); VanDyke v. Coburn Enter., Inc., 873 F.2d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1989);
Currie v. Cayman Resources Corp., 835 F.2d 780, 785 n.1l (lth Cir. 1988); Barker v.
Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1986); Davis v. Avco Fin.
Servs., Inc., 739 F.2d 1057, 1063 (6th Cir. 1984); Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516
(10th Cir. 1983); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 193 (3d Cir. 1981); Broad v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981); lIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 923
(2d Cir. 1980). But see McDonald v. Alan Bush Brokerage Co., 863 F.2d 809, 814 (11 th Cir.
1989) (holding that "severe recklessness" qualifies as scienter under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb5). See generally William S. Lerach & Eric Alan Isaacson, Pleading Scienter Under Section
21D(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Motive, Opportunity, Recklessness, and the
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All the circuits believed that recklessness conformed to the Supreme

Court definition of scienter because recklessness is a form of knowing
or conscious misconduct, differing from ordinary negligence. 45 The
courts held that reckless behavior is akin to a lesser form of intentional
47
conduct. 46 The circuits also uniformly defined recklessness.
Specifically, the courts adopted the "Sundstrand standard, '48 which
describes reckless conduct as a highly unreasonable and extreme
departure from ordinary care, as opposed to simple or even inexcusable
negligence. 49 The departure must create "a danger of misleading buyers
or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the
50
[defendant] must have been aware of it."
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 893, 913-18 (1996)
(tracing the adoption of recklessness by the circuit courts prior to the PSLRA); John F. X. Pelosa
& Stuart M. Samoff, Pleading Scienter Under the Reform Act, 222 N.Y.L.J. 3, 3 (1999)
(commenting on the uniformity among the circuits regarding recklessness); Vizcarrondo &
Houston, supra note 36, at 616 (analyzing the circuit courts approach to recklessness before the
PSLRA).
45. See, e.g., Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1568-69 (holding that recklessness satisfies the scienter
definition as expressed by the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder); Sundstrand Corp.
v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977) (explaining that recklessness is distinct
from negligence). In fact, definitions of recklessness routinely envision a form of conscious
misconduct. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985) (explaining that an individual "acts
recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct").
46. See, e.g., Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1569 (explaining that recklessness more resembles intent
than negligence); Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1045 (defining recklessness "as the functional
equivalent of intent").
47. See Steadman, 967 F.2d at 641-42; K&S Partnership v. Continental Bank, 952 F.2d 971,
978 (8th Cir. 1991); Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1569-70; SEC v. Carriba Air, Inc., 681 F.2d 1318,
1324 (11 th Cir. 1982); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1118 (10th Cir. 1982); Sharp, 649
F.2d at 193; Broad, 642 F.2d at 960-61; Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 625 F.2d 738, 741
(6th Cir. 1980); Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509, 516 (1st Cir. 1978); Roif v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38,46 (2d Cir. 1978); Sundstrand,553 F.2d at 1044-45.
48. See Steadman, 967 F.2d at 641-42; Hollinger,914 F.2d at 1569-70; Hackbart,675 F.2d at
1118; Sharp, 649 F.2d at 193; Broad, 642 F.2d at 960-61; Ohio Drill & Tool, 625 F.2d at 741;
Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1044-45 (adopting the "Sundstrand Standard"); see also K&S
Partnership,952 F.2d at 978; CarribaAir, 681 F.2d at 1324; Hoffman, 587 F.2d at 516; Rolf, 570
F.2d at 46. District courts in the Fourth Circuit adopted the "Sundstrand standard" for
recklessness as well. See Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 730, 740 (W.D. Va.
1982). See generally Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 44, at 913-14 (discussing the widespread
acceptance of the "Sundstrand standard"). The "Sundstrand standard" defines recklessness as
a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable
negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which
presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant
or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.
Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1045 (quoting Franke v. Midwestern Oklahoma Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp.
719 (W.D. Okla. 1976)).
49. See Sundstrand, 553 F.2d at 1044-45.
50. Id. at 1045.
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3. Conflicting Views Regarding the Pleading of Scienter
Although the circuit courts agreed that recklessness satisfied the
scienter pleading requirement imposed by the Supreme Court in Section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 private causes of action, the circuit courts were
divided as to the specificity of facts the plaintiff had to plead in order to
withstand a motion to dismiss. 51 The courts relied on Rule 9(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 52 which sets forth two requirements
concerning pleadings. 53 The Rule first asserts that a plaintiff must plead
facts that constitute fraud with particularity. 54 The Rule also states that
a plaintiff may plead conditions of the mind generally. 55 Each circuit
reached a different conclusion on the level of specificity required when
pleading scienter, however, based on which part of Rule 9(b) it found
56
persuasive.
For example, in In re Time Warner, Inc.,57 the Second Circuit,
relying on the first sentence of Rule 9(b), held that Rule 9(b) requires
the plaintiff to allege facts in the complaint that create a strong inference
of scienter. 58 The court established two different approaches whereby a
51. Compare In re Time Warner Inc., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that plaintiffs
must plead facts that create a strong inference of scienter), with In re Glenfed, Inc., 42 F.3d 1541,
1547-48 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiffs only need to aver scienter generally). See
generally Laurence A. Steckman & Kenneth M. Moltner, Pleading Scienter in Securities Fraud
Cases Under Rule 9(b) - Is the Pleadingof Facts Sufficient to Give Rise to a "Strong Inference"
of FraudulentIntent Really Incompatible with the FederalRules?, 1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 99,
99-112 (1995) (analyzing the conflicting views adopted by the circuit courts in respect to
pleading scienter under Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b));
Vizcarrondo & Houston, supra note 36, at 617 (discussing the lack of uniformity among the
circuits regarding pleading scienter).
52. See Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 265; GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1545 (both examining Rule 9(b) in
order to determine the scienter pleading requirements).
53. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (requiring circumstances of fraud to be stated with particularity
and allowing conditions of the mind to be averred generally).
54. See id. ("In all averments of fraud ... the circumstances constituting fraud.., shall be
stated with particularity.").
55. See id. ("Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be
averred generally.").
56. Compare Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 265 (relying on the first sentence of Rule 9(b), thereby
requiring the plaintiff to plead with particularity), with GlenFed, 42 F.3d at 1545 (relying on the
second sentence of Rule 9(b), thereby allowing the plaintiff to omit facts during pleading that
give rise to a strong inference of a fraudulent intent).
57. In re Time Warner, Inc., 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993).
58. See id. at 268. The court did not, however, require the plaintiff to plead scienter with great
specificity. See id.; accord Greenstone v. Cambex Corp., 975 F.2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1992)
(holding that the plaintiff must plead specific facts demonstrating that the defendant had
possessed the requisite scienter); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1989)
(stating that the complaint must afford a factual basis from which scienter can be inferred). See
generally Steckman & Moltner, supra note 51, at 104-08 (analyzing the Second Circuit's
pleading standard); Vizcarrondo & Houston, supra note 36, at 617 (describing the Second Circuit
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plaintiff may plead scienter. 59 First, the plaintiff may allege facts
demonstrating that the defendant had a motive to commit securities
fraud 60 and the opportunity to do so. 6 1 Second, the plaintiff may "allege
facts constituting circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious
behavior."62
The Ninth Circuit, however, relying on the second sentence of Rule
9(b), held that scienter may be averred generally. 63 In In re Glenfed,
Inc.,64 the court rejected the Second Circuit's strong inference test and
instead declared that a plaintiff may plead scienter merely by claiming
that scienter was present. 65 This division among the circuits led
Congress to enact legislation that purported to establish uniform
guidelines with respect to the pleading of scienter under Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5. 66

standard of pleading as the most rigorous of all of the circuits); William C. Baskin III, Note,
Using Rule 9(b) to Reduce Nuisance Securities Litigation, 99 YALE L.J. 1591, 1601 (1990)
(advocating the use of pleading facts to raise an inference of scienter in order to screen out
frivolous lawsuits at the pleading stage).
59. See Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 268-69; accord Shields v. Citytrust, 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d
Cir. 1994).
60. See Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 269; accord Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128. Motive entails concrete
benefits that the defendant could realize as a result of the misstatements or omissions alleged. See
id. at 1130.
61. See Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 269; accord Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128. Opportunity entails "the
means and likely prospect of achieving concrete benefits by the means alleged." Id. at 1130.
62. Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 269; accord Shields, 25 F.3d at 1128.
63. See In re Glenfed, Inc., 42 F.3d 1541, 1547 (9th Cir. 1994). The court relied on the
second sentence of Rule 9(b) when concluding that particularity is not required when pleading the
defendant's state of mind. See id. at 1545. The court expressly rejected the Second Circuit's
standard of pleading facts that give rise to a strong inference of scienter. See id. at 1545-46.
Therefore, the court held that a plaintiff "may aver scienter generally, just as the rule states - that
is, simply by saying that scienter existed." Id. at 1547.
64. In re Glenfed, Inc., 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994).
65. See id. at 1547. The court similarly rejected the proposal that a plaintiff must plead facts
sufficient to establish some inference of scienter. See id. at 1546. Instead, the court held that a
conclusory allegation of scienter is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. See id. at 1547;
see also Shapiro v. UJB Fin. Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 285 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that scienter may
be averred generally). See generally Steckman & Moltner, supra note 51, at 99-104 (arguing
against the general pleading standard espoused by the Ninth Circuit). Additionally, the court held
that the circumstances constituting fraud must be averred with particularity. See Glenfed, 42 F.3d
at 1547-48. The complaint "must set forth what is false or misleading about a statement, and why
it is false." Id. at 1548.
66. See Pelosa & Sarnoff, supra note 44, at 5 (discussing the rationale behind the PSLRA);
Vizcarrondo & Houston, supra note 36, at 617-19 (stating that the purpose of the PSLRA was
"[t]o eliminate the lack of uniformity among the circuits"); see also 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78u-4(b)(l),
(2) (West 1997). Congress agreed that the pleading standards announced in Rule 9(b) did not
prevent the abuse of the system by private litigants. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740.
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B. The PSLRA
1. The Rationale Behind the PSLRA
In an effort to clarify the standard that a plaintiff must satisfy when
pleading scienter under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, Congress enacted
the PSLRA in December of 1995.67 The PSLRA purported to establish
a clear standard of pleading by demanding that a plaintiff "state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant
acted with the required state of mind."-68 Additionally, the PSLRA
heightened the pleading requirements for the circumstances constituting
the alleged fraud, requiring a plaintiff to specify the facts that
69
surrounded the defendant's misleading statements or omissions.
Failure to meet the pleading requirements results in a dismissal of the
70
plaintiff s complaint.
Congress proposed this legislation to curb the abuses of the securities
class action system. 7 1 The lenient and conflicting pleading standards
67. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737,
758; H.R. CONF. REP NO. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740
(explaining that the goal behind the enactment of the PSLRA is "to establish uniform and more
stringent pleading requirements to curtail the filing of meritless lawsuits"); S. REP. No. 104-98, at
7 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 686 (expressing the desire to adopt a standard
pleading model).
68. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2). The PSLRA provides:
In any private action arising under this chapter in which the plaintiff may recover
money damages only on proof that the defendant acted with a particular state of mind,
the complaint shall, with respect to each act or omission alleged to violate this chapter,
state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind.
69. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(l). The PSLRA provides:
[The complaint shall specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the
reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the
statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with
particularity all facts on which that belief is formed.
Id. See generally Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 44, at 894-95 (arguing that the PSLRA adopted
the Ninth Circuit's standard as pronounced in In re Glenfed, Inc. with respect to pleading falsity).
70. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A) (West 1997).
71. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 5 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 684 (discussing
the need to eliminate frivolous strike suits); Securities Litigation: Hearings on Securities
Litigation Reform Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 8 (1995) (statement of Alfonse M. D'Amato, U.S. Senator)
(expressing the desire to curb frivolous lawsuits without depriving legitimate victims of securities
fraud of a remedy). But see Securities Litigation Revision 1995: Hearings on Title II of H.R. 10
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Commerce,
104th Cong. 143 (1995) (statement of Mark J. Griffin, Director, Division of Securities, North
American Securities Administrators Association) (opposing the heightened pleading requirements
as a bar to meritorious cases). See generally HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, 3
SEC. & FED. CORP. L. § 16.1 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the need to reform Section 10(b) and Rule
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adopted by some circuits encouraged the emergence of several abusive
practices.7 2 First, the standards inspired the frequent filing of lawsuits
in response to any negative fluctuation in the price of stocks. 73 Second,
the ease of surpassing a motion to dismiss created an incentive to target
deep pocket corporate defendants. 74 Third, the system encouraged the
exploitation of the expensive discovery process as a means to achieve a
settlement. 75 Accordingly, when Congress proposed the PSLRA, it

IOb-5 procedures).
72. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31-32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
730-31; S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 5-7 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 684-86 (both
detailing the rationale behind the enactment of the PSLRA).
73. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31; S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4 (proclaiming that
frivolous strike suits "are often based on nothing more than a company's announcement of bad
news"); see also Securities Litigation: Hearings on Securities Litigation Reform Before the
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 104th
Cong. 9 (1995) (statement of Alfonse M. D'Amato, U.S. Senator) (declaring that professional
plaintiffs and class action attorneys who bring strike suits "wreak havoc on the Nation's
boardrooms and courthouses"); Securities Litigation Revisions, 1995: Hearings on Securities
Litigation Reform Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 239 (1995) (statement of Charles C. Cox, Senior Vice-President,
Lexecon, Inc.) (describing the incentives of filing a securities class action lawsuit every time "a
company's stock price drops significantly for any reason"). Securities class action lawsuits are
routinely filed the day of or shortly after a stock price drops. See id. (statement of Charles C.
Cox, Senior Vice-President, Lexecon, Inc.). See generally BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note
71, at xxvi (stating that "[i]f the price of the stock dropped substantially immediately after the bad
news announcement, a class action in many instances was soon to follow").
74. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31; S. REP. No. 104-98, at 9 (stating that "[t]he
deeper the pocket," the more susceptible a firm is to frivolous litigation). Young firms, especially
those in the technology industry, are particularly vulnerable to meritless actions because they are
more likely to experience volatile stock prices. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 33 (recognizing "a
pattern of targeting high technology companies"); Securities Litigation Revisions, 1995: Hearings
on Securities Litigation Reform Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 239-44 (1995) (statement of Charles C. Cox,
Senior Vice-President, Lexecon, Inc.); Securities Litigation, 1995: Hearings on Securities Fraud
Litigation Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 61-64 (1995) (statement of James Morgan, President-Elect, National
Venture Capital Association).
75. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 37 (stating that "discovery costs account for roughly
80% of total litigation costs in securities fraud cases"); S. REP. No. 104-98, at 9 (noting that most
securities lawsuits settle "at an average settlement cost of $8.6 million"); see also Securities
Litigation, 1995: Hearings on Securities FraudLitigation Before the Subcomm. on Securities of
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 61 (1995) (statement of
James Morgan, President-Elect, National Venture Capital Association) (arguing that the high
costs associated with discovery and trial force companies to settle even frivolous lawsuits, a
practice amounting to "legal extortion"); Securities Litigation Revisions, 1995: Hearings on
Securities Litigation Reform Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong. 239 (1995) (statement of Charles C. Cox, Senior VicePresident, Lexecon, Inc.) (observing that most class action securities lawsuits that surpass a
motion to dismiss settle regardless of the merits of the case). Mr. Cox claims that while courts
dismiss approximately one percent of class action securities lawsuits before trial, approximately
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aimed to eliminate these abusive practices by heightening the pleading
76
requirements for Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 plaintiffs.
2. The PSLRA's Legislative History
The House of Representatives passed House Bill 1058 ("H.R. 1058")
in March of 1995, after undergoing much debate and making substantial
modifications regarding the requisite pleading standards.7 7 Originally,
the House defined scienter as knowledge or intent, thus eliminating
recklessness as a sufficient state of mind. 78 The House, however,
subsequently revised the proposal and restored the recklessness standard
of scienter, utilizing the "Sundstrand standard. '79 Also, H.R. 1058
ultimately required a complaint to state specific factual allegations
80
demonstrating that the defendant possessed the requisite scienter.
Thereafter, the Senate adopted Senate Bill 240 ("S. 240"), requiring
the complaint to "specifically allege facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with" scienter. 81 The Senate Banking
Committee's Report asserted that the Senate had adopted a pleading
standard modeled after the Second Circuit's strong inference standard,

ninety-six percent of the lawsuits settle. See id.
76. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 32-48; S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (urging for the
adoption of "a uniform and stringent pleading requirement to curtail the filing of abusive
lawsuits").
77. See 141 CONG. REC. H2818-01 (daily ed. March 8, 1995). House Bill 1058 required a
plaintiff to plead "specific allegations which if true, would be sufficient to establish scienter as to
each defendant at the time the alleged violation occurred." H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. § 4 (1995).
See generally Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 44, at 930-40 (discussing the evolution of H.R.
1058).
78. See H.R. 10, 104th Cong. § 10 (1995) (requiring that the plaintiff plead "specific facts"
demonstrating "that the defendant knew the statement was misleading at the time it was made, or
intentionally omitted to state a fact knowing the omission would render misleading the statements
made at the time they were made"). This early House proposal met considerable opposition from
the SEC. See Securities Litigation Revision 1995: Hearings on Securities Litigation Reform
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Commerce,
104th Cong., 191-220 (1995) (statement of Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman). Mr. Levitt endorsed
the recklessness standard and admonished a requirement of knowledge or intent. See id. at 20103. Further, Mr. Levitt argued that requiring plaintiffs to allege specific facts regarding scienter
without conducting discovery was too burdensome. See id. at 199.
79. See 141 CONG. REC. H2818-26 (daily ed. March 8, 1995). H.R. 1058 defined
recklessness as "highly unreasonable conduct that (A) involves not merely simple or even gross
negligence, but an extreme departure from standards of ordinary care, and (B) presents a danger
of misleading buyers, sellers, or security holders that was either known to the defendant or so
obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it." H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. § 10(a) (1995);
see also supra note 48 and accompanying text (describing the "Sundstrand standard").
80. See H.R. 1058, 104th Cong. § 10(b) (1995).
81. S. 240, 104th Cong. § 104 (1995).
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even though it had not adopted the Second Circuit's relevant caselaw. 82
Moreover, the Senate Report recognized that every federal circuit had
83
held that recklessness satisfied the definition of scienter.
Subsequently, however, the Senate passed an amendment to S. 240
("Specter Amendment"), proposed by Senator Arlen Specter, which
expressly incorporated the entire Second Circuit caselaw pleading
standard. 84 This amendment included the recklessness standard as an
adequate scienter and the ability to plead scienter by alleging that the
defendant had both the motive and the opportunity to commit fraud.85
S.240 included the Specter Amendment when it passed the Senate on
June 28, 1995.86
87
After the passage of the amendment, the Committee of Conference,
in an attempt to reconcile the conflicting legislation of the House and
the Senate, accepted the language of the Senate Banking Committee's
text that combined aspects of Rule 9(b) with the "strong inference"
pleading standard of the Second Circuit. 88 Specifically, the Conference
82. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694. The
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs reported that:
The Committee does not adopt a new and untested pleading standard that would
generate additional litigation. Instead, the Committee chose a uniform standard
modeled upon the pleading standard of the Second Circuit. Regarded as the most
stringent pleading standard, the Second Circuit requires that the plaintiff plead facts
that give rise to a "strong inference" of defendant's fraudulent intent. The Committee
does not intend to codify the Second Circuit's caselaw interpreting this pleading
standard, although courts may find this body of law instructive.
Id.; see also supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (describing the Second Circuit pleading
standard).
83. See S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 44. The Senate Report noted that "common law has long
recognized recklessness as a form of scienter for purposes of proving fraud." Id. (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 526(b), cmt. e; PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 107). Further, the Senate Report observed that courts have generally accepted the
"Sundstrand standard" when defining recklessness. See id.
84. See 141 CONG. REc. S9170 (daily ed. June 27, 1995).
85. See id. The Specter Amendment provided:
[A] strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind may be
established either - (A) by alleging facts to show that the defendant had both motive
and opportunity to commit fraud; or (B) by alleging facts that constitute strong
circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness by the defendant.
Id. See generally Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 44, at 944-47 (discussing the Specter
Amendment).
86. See 141 CONG. REC. S9219-26 (daily ed. June 28, 1995).
87. The House and Senate managers responsible for reconciling differences between House
and Senate bills comprise the Committee of Conference. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at
31 (1995), reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
88. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41. The Statement of Managers explains that "[tihe
Conference Committee language is based in part on the pleading standard of the Second
Circuit... [and is also] specifically written to conform the language to Rule 9(b)'s notion of
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Committee required the plaintiff in a Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
action to "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 89 The
Committee, however, deleted the recklessness definition proposed by
the House 9° and the Specter Amendment proposed by the Senate. 91 The
Statement of Managers, which accompanied the Conference
Committee's report, explained that the Conference Committee did not
intend to codify Second Circuit caselaw interpreting the scienter
pleading requirements because the goal was "to strengthen existing
to
pleading requirements." 92 Therefore, the Conference Report refused
93
include requirements regarding recklessness, motive, or opportunity.
Although the PSLRA did not define the "required state of mind" a
plaintiff must allege in Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 cases, 94 the
PSLRA did specify knowledge 95 as the required state of mind in two
other sections. 96 First, the PSLRA created a "safe harbor" for forwardlooking statements by eliminating liability for the maker of such a
statement unless the maker had actual knowledge that the statement was
false or misleading. 97 Second, the PSLRA allows a defendant to be

pleading with particularity." Id. The Statement adopted this language because the Second
Circuit's "strong inference" pleading requirement is "[riegarded as the most stringent pleading
standard" among the circuits. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Draft Conference Report, Oct. 23, 1995, at 27; H.R. CONF. REP. 104-369, at 41 &
n.23; see also supra note 79 and accompanying text (discussing H.R. 1058's inclusion of the
"Sundstrand standard" definition of recklessness).
91. See Draft Conference Report, Oct. 23, 1995, at 32; H.R. CONF. REP. 104-369, at 41 &
n.23; see also supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text (discussing S. 240's inclusion of the
Specter Amendment).
92. H.R. CONF. REP. 104-369, at 41. The Statement of Managers expressed the desire to
"strengthen existing pleading requirements." Id. Therefore, "the Second Circuit's caselaw
interpreting" the pleading standard is not codified. Id.
93. See id. at 41 n.23. The Conference Report declined "to include in the pleading standard
certain language relating to motive, opportunity, or recklessness." Id.
94. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing the elimination of the recklessness
standard).
95. The definition of knowledge in the PSLRA specifically excludes recklessness as a ground
for liability. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(g)(10)(B) (West 1997).
96. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(g)(2)(A) (West 1997) (concerning joint and several liability); 15
U.S.C.A. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B) (West 1997) (involving forward-looking statements).
97. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-5(c)(l)(B). The safe harbor provision provides that a defendant
"may not be held liable.., for projections and other forward-looking statements.., that later
prove to be inaccurate if ... the plaintiff fails to prove the statement was made with actual
knowledge that it was materially false or misleading." Id. The purpose of this provision was to
encourage companies to disclose forward-looking information without fear of being subjected to
frivolous strike suits. See S. REP. No. 98, at 16 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 695;
see also Jay B. Kasner, The Safe Harborfor Forwardlooking Statements under the Private
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jointly and severally liable for damages only if the defendant knowingly
98
violated the securities laws.
3. President Clinton's Veto and the Veto-Override
President Clinton vetoed the revised PSLRA in December of 1995. 99
The President objected to several provisions of the bill, including the
10 0
imposition of a heightened pleading requirement for scienter.
President Clinton expressed concern that the Conference Committee
raised the pleading standard beyond the level required by the Second
Circuit, thereby creating an insurmountable hurdle to plaintiffs. 10 1 He
explained that he would support the legislation if Congress reinserted
the Specter Amendment into the bill and expressly adopted the Second
02
Circuit's pleading requirements. 1
Despite President Clinton's concerns that Congress raised the
pleading standard for scienter above that of the Second Circuit,
Congress overrode President Clinton's veto and enacted the PSLRA
into law without changing the pleading standard. 10 3 During the vetooverride debates, several congressional members declared that, despite
legislative history to the contrary, the Statement of Managers, and the
rejection of the Specter Amendment, the PSLRA did adopt the Second
Circuit's pleading standard.' 0 On the other hand, other members of
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 1136 PLl/Corp 119, 130-31 (1999) (analyzing the
rationale behind the safe harbor provision).
98. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(g)(2)(A). Further, the joint and several liability provisions
provide that "nothing in this subsection shall be construed to create, affect, or in any manner
modify, the standard for liability associated with any action arising under the securities laws."
§ 78u-4(g)(1).
99. See H.R. DOC. No. 104-150 (1995), 141 CONG. REC. H15214-15 (daily ed. Dec. 20,
1995) (veto message of President Clinton).
100. See 141 CONG. REC. S19035 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995).
101. See id. President Clinton believed that the Conference Committee's pleading
requirements "with regard to a defendant's state of mind impose[d] an unacceptable procedural
hurdle to meritous claims being heard in Federal courts." Id. Moreover, the President was
"prepared to support the high pleading standards of the ... Second Circuit." Id. The President
worried, however, that the Conference Committee made "crystal clear in the Statement of the
Managers their intent to raise the standard even beyond that level." Id. The President asserted
that he was not prepared to endorse legislation that went beyond the Second Circuit's level. See
id.
102. See id.; see also supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text (discussing the Specter
Amendment). See generally BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 71, § 16.5 (discussing
President Clinton's veto).
103. See Pub. Law 104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4).
104. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. H15219 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Lofgren)
(stating that the Second Circuit standard for pleading scienter is incorporated in the legislation);
141 CONG. REC. H15218 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moran) (concluding that
the text of the legislation incorporates the Second Circuit standard and that the Second Circuit
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Congress concluded that the new standard did not incorporate the
Second Circuit's caselaw regarding recklessness, motive, and
05
opportunity. 1
C. Subsequent Securities FraudLegislation
Initially, because the PSLRA applies only to actions filed in federal
court, plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions were able to avoid the
16
PSLRA requirements by filing lawsuits in state court under state law. 0
In order to impose uniform nationwide standards, however, Congress
enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
("SLUSA").'1 7 SLUSA mandates the filing of securities class actions in
federal court when the action involves nationally traded securities and is
based on allegations of the same type as those of Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5.' 8 The SLUSA, however, does not alter or amend the text of the
PSLRA or even mention scienter. 1°9 Nonetheless, in the legislative
history of the SLUSA, Congress attempted to clarify the scienter
pleading standards enunciated in the PSLRA.11 0 The Committee Report
expressed that Congress, when enacting the PSLRA, did not intend to
alter the scienter requirements established by the Second Circuit with

standard will be applied because "when legislation is at variance with legislative history or report
language .... it is the bill itself that prevails"); 141 CONG. REC. S19068 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Dodd) (explaining that courts will continue to follow Second Circuit guidance
even though it has not been codified). See generally Lerach & Isaacson, supra note 44, at 952-56
(arguing that the veto-override debates support the conclusion that Congress intended to adopt
Second Circuit caselaw regarding recklessness, motive, and opportunity).
105. See., e.g., 141 CONG. REC. H15216 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Markey)
(arguing that the legislation should include the Specter Amendment, which adopted the Second
Circuit pleading standard in regards to recklessness, motive, and opportunity, because otherwise,
the legislation heightens the standard beyond the Second Circuit level); 141 CONG. REC. H15216
(daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Dingell) (agreeing with the President that the
legislation heightens the pleading requirements above those of the Second Circuit).
106. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(a)(1) (West 1997) (providing that the PSLRA applies to private
actions arising under federal law); Daniel J. Kramer, Reforming the Securities Reform Act with
National Pleading Standards, 221 N.Y.L.J. 1, 1 (1999) (commenting on the ability to avoid the
PSLRA by filing in state court). State courts experienced a dramatic increase in the number of
securities cases brought before them in the years following the enactment of the PSLRA. See
Rosen, supra note 4, at 1923.
107. See Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77p (West 1997 & Supp. 2000), 78bb(f) (West Supp. 2000)).
108. See id. The SLUSA provides that a securities class action lawsuit must be pursued in
federal court if the complaint alleges "a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact" or "that
the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security." Id.
109. See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77p, 78bb(f).
110. See S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 6 (1998); H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 105-803, at 15 (1998).
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regard to recklessness, motive, and opportunity."' Further, President
Clinton signed the SLUSA into law after receiving assurances from
members of Congress that the PSLRA maintained the Second Circuit's
pleading standard. 112 During the floor debates in both the House and
the Senate, however, disagreement continued about whether the PSLRA
13
codified the Second Circuit pleading standard."
III. DISCUSSION

Congress enacted the PSLRA to solve the aforementioned
disagreement among the circuits concerning the requirements necessary
to plead scienter under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.11 4 The circuits,
however, continue to disagree on the requisite state of mind that a
plaintiff must allege 115 and the level of specificity the plaintiff must
meet in the complaint with regard to scienter. 116 With respect to the
defendant's state of mind, the circuits are split as to whether
recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement l 7 or whether a
heightened degree of recklessness, such as deliberate recklessness or
conscious misconduct, 118 is necessary to satisfy the requirement.

111. See S. REP. NO. 105-182, at 6; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-803, at 15. The Conference
Report provides "that the clear intent in 1995 and.., in this legislation is that neither the Reform
Act nor [the SLUSA] in any way alters the scienter standard in federal securities fraud suits." S.
REP. No. 105-182, at 6; see also supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (discussing the
Second Circuit's scienter pleading requirements).
112. See 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 767 (statement by President William J. Clinton). President
Clinton claimed that Congress made clear its intent to codify the Second Circuit standard during
the veto-override debate. See id. at 767-68. President Clinton stated that the Statement of
Managers that accompanied the SLUSA assured him "that reckless conduct will continue to be
actionable and that complaints meeting the Second Circuit pleading standard will permit investors
access to our Nation's courts." Id. at 768.
113. See Uniform Securities Litigation Standards Act Signed into Law, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) No. 1844, at 2 (Nov. 11, 1998) (concluding that "despite Congress' efforts to clarify its
intent, some uncertainty may still persist").
114. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2) (West 1997); see also Pelosa & Sarnoff, supra note 44, at
3 (stating that the PSLRA attempted to create "a uniform national standard for pleading
scienter"); supra Part II.A.3 (discussing the conflicting views among the circuits regarding the
pleading of scienter prior to the enactment of the PSLRA).
115. See, e.g., In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999) (adopting
deliberate recklessness or conscious misconduct standard); In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d 525,
535 (3d Cir. 1999) (adopting recklessness as the scienter standard).
116. See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 199 (1st Cir. 1999); Bryant v. Avado
Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1286-87 (11th Cir. 1999); In re Comshare, Inc., 183 F.3d 542, 551
(6th Cir. 1999); Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979; Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534-35; Press v.
Chemical Inves. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999).
117. See infra Part III.A. I (discussing the recklessness standard); see also Advanta, 180 F.3d
at 535; Press, 166 F.3d at 538 (both adopting the recklessness standard).
118. See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing the deliberate recklessness standard); see also Silicon
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Regarding the degree of specificity a plaintiff must plead in order to
withstand a motion to dismiss, the issue remains whether the pleading
of motive and opportunity alone is sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss. 119 The circuits have essentially established three distinct
approaches: (1) the Second Circuit's pre-PSLRA approach; 120 (2) the
Ninth Circuit's heightened pleading standard approach; 121 and (3) the
totality of the circumstances approach. 122 The Second Circuit's prePSLRA approach, the most lenient, allows allegations of motive and
opportunity to suffice when pleading scienter. 123 The Ninth Circuit's
heightened pleading standard approach, the most stringent, does not
allow the pleading of motive and opportunity alone to satisfy the
plaintiff's burden. 124 The totality of the circumstances approach
mandates a fact specific, case-by-case inquiry into whether the plaintiff
125
has established that the defendant possessed the requisite scienter.
These conflicting approaches result from divergent interpretations of the
127
and the policy
PSLRA's text, 126 the PSLRA's legislative history,
128
PSLRA.
the
of
enactment
the
concerns underlying
A. The Defendant's State of Mind: Recklessness v. Deliberate
Recklessness
Virtually every circuit to address the issue of the scienter requirement
has held that recklessness satisfies the PSLRA.129 These circuits remain
Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974 (adopting the deliberate recklessness or conscious misconduct
standard).
119. See infra Part III.B (discussing the varying interpretations of the circuits as to whether
pleading motive and opportunity alone satisfies the scienter pleading requirements).
120. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the adoption of the pre-PSLRA Second Circuit
approach to motive and opportunity pleading).
121. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's approach to motive and opportunity
pleading).
122. See infra Part I1I.B.3 (discussing the totality of the circumstances approach).
123. See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the adoption of the pre-PSLRA Second Circuit
approach to motive and opportunity pleading).
124. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the Ninth Circuit approach to motive and opportunity
pleading).
125. See infra Part. IH.B.3 (discussing the totality of the circumstances approach).
126. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (discussing the language of the PLSRA).
127. See supra Part II.B.2 (tracing the PSLRA's legislative history).
128. See supra Part II.B. 1 (summarizing the rationale behind the enactment of the PSLRA).
129. See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 199 (1st Cir. 1999) (deciding that
scienter includes a narrowly defined concept of recklessness); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187
F.3d 1271, 1287 (1lth Cir. 1999) (holding that the PSLRA did not eliminate recklessness as a
basis for liability); In re Comshare, Inc., 183 F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that "a
plaintiff may survive a motion to dismiss by pleading facts that give rise to a strong inference of
recklessness"); In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding that
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committed to the "Sundstrand standard" of recklessness set forth before
the PSLRA enactment.1 3 ° The Ninth Circuit, however, departed from
the recklessness standard when it declared that mere recklessness no
longer suffices under the PSLRA because the PSLRA heightened the
pleading standards for Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 plaintiffs.' 3 1
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that, instead of mere recklessness,
deliberate recklessness or conscious
scienter encompasses
132
misconduct.
1. Recklessness: Adoption of the Pre-PSLRA "Sundstrand Standard"
The Fifth and Second Circuits were the first circuits to conclude that
recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement under the PSLRA. 133 The
Fifth Circuit, in dicta and without discussion, noted that the PSLRA
codified the pleading standard set forth by the Second Circuit before the
enactment of the PSLRA, including the acceptance of recklessness as an
adequate scienter. 134 Subsequently, in Press v. Chemical Investment
Services Corp., 135 the Second Circuit, without explanation or analysis,
concluded that the PSLRA adopted the Second Circuit's pre-PSLRA
requirements for pleading scienter in Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
actions.136 Therefore, plaintiffs can defeat a motion to dismiss by

recklessness "remains a sufficient basis for liability"); Press v. Chemical Inves. Servs. Corp., 166
F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that scienter encompasses "conscious misbehavior or
recklessness"); see also Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 620 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that
"a plaintiff must still prove that the defendant acted intentionally, which may perhaps be shown
by recklessness"). But see In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999)
(adopting the heightened deliberate recklessness or conscious misconduct standard for scienter).
130. See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 201 (holding that the PSLRA did not alter the definition of
scienter previously used by the First Circuit); Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1284 (defining recklessness
using the "Sundstrand standard"); Comshare, 183 F.3d at 550 (maintaining that recklessness
embodies the "Sundstrand standard"); Advanta, 180 F.3d at 535 (adhering to the "Sundstrand
standard"); see also Phillips, 190 F.3d at 621 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that securities laws generally
utilize the "Sundstrand standard" when defining recklessness). See generally supra Part II.A.2
(describing the pre-PSLRA acceptance of recklessness and the "Sundstrand standard").
131. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974 (adopting the deliberate recklessness or conscious
misconduct standard for scienter); see also supra note 48 (describing the "Sundstrand standard").
132, See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974.
133. See Press, 166 F.3d at 538; Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir.
1997).
134. See Williams, 112 F.3d at 178 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
41 (1995); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (West 1997)). The provisions of the PSLRA, however, did not
apply in Williams because the plaintiffs filed the lawsuit before the effective date of the PSLRA.
See id.
135. Press v. Chemical Inves. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529 (2d Cir. 1999).
136. See Press, 166 F.3d at 537-38. The Second Circuit stated that the PSLRA "heightened
the requirement for pleading scienter to the level used by the Second Circuit." See id.
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circumstantial evidence of
alleging "facts that 'constitute strong
' 137
conscious misbehavior or recklessness."'
The Third Circuit followed, accepting the view expressed by the
Second Circuit 138 and elaborating on the rationale behind the
decision. 139 In In re Advanta Corp.,14 after examining the PSLRA's
purpose, 14 ' legislative history, and text, the Third Circuit concluded that
the PSLRA did not alter the substantive definition of scienter
established prior to its enactment. 14 2 The Third Circuit, referring to the
PSLRA's legislative history as ambiguous, contradictory, and
inconclusive, 143 focused on the PSLRA's text when determining

137. Id. at 538 (citing Shields v. Citytrust Bankcorp., Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994));
see also Chill v. General Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 267 (2d Cir. 1996) ("As a pleading
requirement, a plaintiff must either (a) allege facts to show that defendants had both motive and
opportunity to commit fraud or (b) allege facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of
conscious misbehavior or recklessness."). In Press, the court determined that the plaintiff
satisfied the pleading requirements because he alleged facts demonstrating that the defendant
possessed both the motive and the opportunity to commit fraud. See Press, 166 F.3d at 538.
138. See In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d 525, 533-34 (3d Cir. 1999) (adhering to the Second
Circuit standard of pleading scienter by alleging facts that establish the motive and opportunity to
commit fraud or alleging facts that constitute evidence of reckless or conscious misbehavior); see
also supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text (summarizing the Second Circuit's standard).
139. See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 530-35 (discussing the PSLRA's background).
140. In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 1999). Former shareholders of the defendant
corporation brought suit against the corporation and several of its officers under Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 after the corporation suffered a $20 million loss. See id. at 528. The plaintiffs
alleged that the corporation, a credit card issuer, maintained a practice of issuing credit cards at
low introductory rates in an effort to boost revenues. See id. The plaintiffs further allege that this
practice resulted in attracting riskier customers who later defaulted in their payments, causing
losses for the company. See id. When these losses became imminent, the plaintiffs contend that
the defendants issued misleading statements that portrayed the company in a favorable light,
including the assurance that the company would continue to achieve earnings growth. See id. at
528-29. Further, the plaintiffs pled that the defendants either knew the statements were
misleading or must have known that the statements were misleading due to their positions within
the company. See id. at 539.
141. The Advanta court recognized that the PSLRA's purpose was to curb the abuses of the
securities class action system, including the practice of filing frivolous lawsuits in response to any
negative fluctuation in stock price, the targeting of deep pocket corporate defendants, the
exploitation of the expensive discovery process to encourage settlement, and the manipulation of
clients by plaintiff attorneys. See id. at 531.
142. See id. at 530-35.
143. See id. at 531. The Advanta court discussed the activity in the House, including House
Bill 10, which eliminated recklessness as a satisfactory scienter, and House Bill 1058, which
reinstated recklessness as a sufficient scienter, and the Senate, including the deletion of the
Specter Amendment, which expressly adopted recklessness as an acceptable scienter. See id. at
531-32. Further, the court analyzed President Clinton's veto and the veto-override debate. See
id. at 532-33. Moreover, the court gave little effect to the legislative history of the SLUSA,
which attempted to clarify Congress' intent when enacting the PLSRA. See id. at 533 (stating
that their interpretation of the PSLRA "is unaffected by the legislative history of the" SLUSA).
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whether scienter encompasses recklessness. 144 While the PSLRA
intended to heighten pleading requirements and establish uniform
standards for plaintiffs in Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions, the text
did not modify the substantive law of scienter.145 Therefore, according
to the Third Circuit, recklessness, as defined by the "Sundstrand
47
standard,"' 146 remains a satisfactory basis for liability. 1
In In re Comshare, Inc., 148 the Sixth Circuit joined the Fifth, Second,
and Third Circuits when it held that a plaintiff may survive a motion to
dismiss by pleading facts that give rise to a strong inference of
recklessness. 149 The Comshare court took notice of the fact that the
PSLRA expressly specified knowledge or intent as the requisite scienter
in the context of forward-looking statements and joint and several
liability, 150 yet declined to define scienter in cases involving Section

144. See id.
145. See id. at 534. The Third Circuit elaborated that "if Congress had desired to
eliminate.., recklessness as a basis for scienter, it could have done so expressly in the text ......
Id. at 534 n.8. Instead, Congress choose "to leave the matter to judicial interpretation." Id. The
Advanta court acknowledged and rejected the Ninth Circuit's deliberate recklessness standard on
this ground. See id. at 534; see also infra Part III.A.2 (summarizing the Ninth Circuit's scienter
standard).
146. See supra note 48 (describing the "Sundstrand standard").
147. See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 535. The court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint because it
failed to allege facts that lead to a strong inference of recklessness. See id. at 541. The plaintiffs
did not plead facts to support their allegations that "the defendants acted knowingly" and the
"defendants must have been aware of the impending losses by virtue of their positions within the
company." Id. at 539. The court noted that conclusory assertions are insufficient when pleading
scienter. See id. Moreover, "generalized imputations of knowledge" are insufficient even where
the defendants hold high positions within the company. Id. Further, the court held that the
plaintiff's allegations that the defendants recklessly embarked on a risky strategy of attracting
new credit card customers do not establish the extreme departure from ordinary care as mandated
by the "Sundstrand standard." See id. at 540. Accordingly, the court held that the defendant's
positive portrayals did not amount to recklessness. See id.
148. In re Comshare, Inc., 183 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999). The plaintiffs, shareholders of
Comshare, Inc., a computer software developer, brought suit under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
against the corporation and several of its officers, alleging that the defendants perpetrated a
scheme to defraud investors. See id.at 545-47. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the
company's United Kingdom subsidiary violated the company's policy when it recognized
revenue from transactions not yet completed, thereby inflating the company's value. See id. at
546-47. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint because the plaintiffs failed to
plead specific facts creating a strong inference that the defendants committed a knowing
misrepresentation. See id. at 549.
149. See id. at 549. The Sixth Circuit relied on the plain language of the PSLRA because they
believed the legislative history of the PSLRA to be contradictory and ambiguous. See id. at 552
& n.10 (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 185-86 & n.3 (1991); Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 n.29 (1971)).
150. See id. at 549-50; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-5(c)(l)(B) (West 1997); 15 U.S.C.A. §
78u-4(f)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2000); supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text (discussing
forward-looking statements and joint and several liability under the PSLRA).
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10(b) and Rule lOb-5.1 51 According to the Comshare court, this
omission illustrated Congress' intent to preserve the substantive law
regarding scienter.' 52 The court assumed that Congress, when enacting
the PSLRA, was cognizant of the then prevailing acceptance of

recklessness as an adequate level of scienter under Section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5.1 53 The court, therefore, concluded that Congress, by its
154
silence, sustained the recklessness standard.
Moreover, the Comshare court steadfastly adhered to the "Sundstrand
standard" when it defined recklessness. 155 The court interpreted the
standard as more akin to conscious misbehavior than to a mere
heightened form of negligence. 156 The Sixth Circuit ruled that the
district court erred by limiting scienter to knowledge or intent. 157 The
Comshare court, however, affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs'
complaint because the plaintiffs' failed to allege facts that created a
58
strong inference of recklessness. 1
Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit, in Bryant v. Avado Brands,
Inc., 159 conducted an analysis that closely resembled that of the Sixth
Circuit in Comshare.16° The Bryant court relied on the PSLRA's plain

151. See Comshare, 183 F.3d at 549-50.
152. See id. at 550.
153. See id.; see also supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the pre-PSLRA acceptance of
recklessness).
154. See Comshare, 183 F.3d at 552 (noting "that the PSLRA nowhere altered the state of
mind requirements for securities fraud cases").
155. See id. at 550; see also supra note 48 (describing the "Sundstrand standard").
156. See Comshare, 183 F.3d at 550. The Comshare court described the "Sundstrand
standard" as a stringent formulation that is close to a lesser form of intent. See id.
157. See id. at 552.
158. See id. at 553. The Comshare court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts
demonstrating that the revenue recognition errors committed by the company's United Kingdom
subsidiary were so obvious that the defendants should have known of them. See id. The
plaintiffs also failed to plead any facts illustrative of "red flags that should have put Defendants
on notice of the revenue recognition errors." Id. The court concluded that recklessness will not
be presumed "from a parent corporation's reliance on its subsidiary's internal controls." Id. at
554. Because claims of scienter cannot be based "on speculation and conclusory allegations," the
court determined that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead scienter. Id. at 553 (quoting San
Leandro Emergency Med. Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 813 (2d Cir. 1996)).
159. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff shareholders
brought suit against the Avado Brands, Inc. and several of its officers, alleging that the defendants
failed to disclose information relating to two problematic acquisitions and misrepresented the
financial outlook of the company in order to inflate the value of the company's stock. See id. at
1273-74.
160. See id. at 1281-84 (analyzing the PSLRA's scienter requirements); Comshare, Inc., 183
F.3d at 548-53 (analyzing the scienter pleading requirements under the PSLRA); see also supra
notes 148-58 and accompanying text (discussing the Sixth Circuit's analysis in Comshare).
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language 16 1 and concluded that since Congress declined to define the
defendant's "required state of mind"'162 in Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
actions, 163 Congress intended to uphold the pre-PSLRA rule that
pleading facts which constitute recklessness satisfies the scienter
requirement. 164 Therefore, the Bryant court held that plaintiffs could
survive a motion to dismiss by pleading facts that demonstrate that the
' 165
defendant acted with "severe recklessness."
The Fourth Circuit was the next circuit to address the issue of
whether recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement under the
PSLRA. 166 The Fourth Circuit acknowledged the controversy
surrounding the proper scienter pleading standard, noting that the
Second and Ninth Circuits have reached divergent results regarding the
necessary level of scienter a plaintiff must allege to withstand a motion
to dismiss.1 67 The Fourth Circuit then concluded that the PSLRA did
161. The Eleventh Circuit declared that "[w]hen interpreting a statute, we look to its plain
language, resorting to legislative history in an attempt to discern congressional intent only when
the language of the statute is unclear." Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1283 (citing Consumer Prod. Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
162. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2) (West 1997).
163. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1283-84. The Eleventh Circuit also commented on the inclusion
of a knowledge requirement for forward-looking statements. See id. at 1284 (citing 15 U.S.C. §
78u-5(c)(l)(B) (West 1997)) (noting the safe-harbor provision in the PSLRA). The court
concluded that if Congress had desired to raise the scienter requirement to knowledge or intent, it
would have done so expressly, as it had done with forward-looking statements. See id.; see also
supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text (discussing forward-looking statements under the
PSLRA).
164. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1283-84. The Eleventh Circuit expressly rejected the Ninth
Circuit's deliberate recklessness standard, claiming that the Ninth Circuit ignored the plain
meaning behind the PSLRA's statutory language. See id. at 1284-85 & n.21. The Bryant court
admonished the Ninth Circuit for attempting "to import into the law a new and uncertain superrecklessness... [that] is inconsistent with the plain statutory language." Id. at 1285 n.21 (citation
omitted); see also infra Part III.A.2 (summarizing the Ninth Circuit's deliberate recklessness
standard).
165. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1283. The definition for "severe recklessness" mirrors that of the
"Sundstrand standard." See id. at 1282 & n.18; see also supra note 48 (describing the
"Sundstrand standard"). In fact, the Bryant court noted that the Eleventh Circuit's "severe
recklessness" standard is based on the "Sundstrand standard." See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1284 &
n.21. After establishing the scienter pleading guidelines, the court vacated the district court
decision and remanded the case. See id. at 1287.
166. See Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 621 (4th Cir. 1999). The plaintiffs, former
shareholders of LCI, filed suit against LCI and its chief executive under Section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5. See id. at 613. The complaint alleged that the executive had issued a public statement
asserting that LCI was not for sale. See id. The plaintiffs claim they sold their stock at this time,
when the stock price was artificially depressed. See id. at 613. Shortly thereafter, however,
another company acquired LCI and the plaintiffs allege that the companies were negotiating the
merger at the time of the executive's statement. See id. The plaintiffs filed suit after LCI's stock
price rose in reaction to the announcement of the merger. See id.
167. See id. at 620-21 (discussing the approaches established by the Second and Ninth
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not purport to alter the level of scienter a plaintiff must plead in a
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 action. 168 Therefore, a plaintiff must
plead facts that demonstrate that the defendant acted with intent, which
may perhaps encompass recklessness. 169 The Fourth Circuit applied the
"Sundstrand standard" of recklessness 170 and ultimately determined that
it need not resolve the issue of the requisite pleading standard because
the plaintiffs had failed to meet even the more lenient Second Circuit
standard of pleading.171
The First Circuit, in Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 172 was the final
circuit to address the issue of whether recklessness satisfies the scienter
requirement in Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions. 173 In Greebel, the
First Circuit joined the Second, Third, Sixth, Eleventh, and Fourth
Circuits in holding that recklessness is a sufficient scienter under the
PSLRA because Congress, when enacting the PSLRA, did not intend to
174
alter the pre-PSLRA definition of scienter accepted by the circuits.
The Greebel court adhered to its pre-PSLRA definition of

Circuits); see also supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text (summarizing the Second Circuit's
holding); infra Part HI.A.2 (summarizing the Ninth Circuit's holding).
168. See Phillips, 190 F.3d at 620 (favorably citing In re Comshare, Inc., 183 F.3d 542, 548
(6th Cir. 1999)).
169. See id. (citing Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 1994)).
170. See id. at 621 (noting that "[the securities laws generally define recklessness as" the
"Sundstrand standard"); see also supra note 48 (describing the "Sundstrand standard").
171. See Phillips, 190 F.3d at 621; see also supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text
(summarizing the Second Circuit's standard). The court held that the executive had not made a
material misstatement of fact because a reasonable investor would not have considered the
statement significant. See Phillips, 190 F.3d at 615. The Fourth Circuit determined that because
the plaintiffs had failed to prove that the executive had made a material misstatement of fact, the
plaintiffs had obviously failed to adequately allege that the defendants acted intentionally or
recklessly when making the statements. See id. at 620-21. Additionally, the plaintiffs failed to
allege facts sufficient to establish that the defendants possessed the motive and the opportunity to
commit securities fraud. See id. at 621.
172. Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 188-89 (1st Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal
of suit alleging failure to "disclose the threats to [FTP's] continued success ... and several
'questionable' sales practices").
173. See id. at 198.
174. See id. at 199-201. The First Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit's position that only
deliberate recklessness or conscious misconduct is a sufficient scienter under the PSLRA. See id.
at 199; see also infra Part III.A.2 (summarizing the Ninth Circuit's holding). The court reasoned
that if Congress had intended to modify the existing definition of scienter, it would have done so
expressly, as it had done with forward-looking statements and joint and several liability. See
Greebel, 194 F.3d at 200-01; see also 15 U.S.C.A § 78u-5(c)(l)(B) (West 1997); 15 U.S.C.A. §
78u-4(f)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2000); supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text (discussing the
imposition of knowledge as a requisite scienter for forward-looking statements and joint and
several liability under the PSLRA).
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76
recklessness, 175 the "Sundstrand standard."1

2. A Heightened Level of Scienter: Deliberate Recklessness or
Conscious Misconduct
In In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., 177 the Ninth Circuit, over a strong
dissent, dramatically departed from the recklessness standard
established before the enactment of the PSLRA 178 and subsequently
embraced by the Second, 7 9 Third,' 80 and Sixth18 ' Circuits. 8 2 The
Ninth Circuit held that, under the PSLRA, a plaintiff in a Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5 action must plead facts in the complaint that comprise
strong evidence that the defendant acted with deliberate recklessness or
conscious misconduct. 183 After analyzing the PSLRA's purpose,
legislative history, and text, the Silicon Graphics court concluded that
deliberate recklessness best embodied Congress' intent when enacting
the PSLRA.'14

The Silicon Graphics court acknowledged that, prior to the enactment
of the PSLRA, the Ninth Circuit adopted the "Sundstrand standard" of

175. See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 198 (citing Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir.
1978); Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509, 515-16 (1st Cir. 1978)) (discussing the First
Circuit's pre-PSLRA adoption of the "Sundstrand standard").
176. See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 198; see also supra note 48 (describing the "Sundstrand
standard"). The Greebel court described the "Sundstrand standard" of recklessness as close to "a
lesser form of intent," different from negligence in degree and kind. Greebel, 194 F.3d at 199.
177. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999). The plaintiff, a shareholder of
Silicon Graphics, Inc., filed this lawsuit under Section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 against the company
and several of its officers, alleging that the defendants made a series of misleading, positive
statements regarding the financial condition of Silicon Graphics, Inc. See id. at 980-81. The
complaint alleges that, during the time it made these statements, the company experienced severe
quality control problems and declining sales. See id. at 981. The plaintiff contended that the
statements omitted the negative information and artificially inflated the value of the company's
stock. See id. When rumors of the problems began to circulate, the stock price dropped and soon
thereafter the defendants confirmed the rumors to the public. See id. at 982. The district court
dismissed the plaintiff's complaint because "it failed to satisfy the heightened pleading standard
imposed by the PSLRA." Id. at 982-83.
178. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the pre-PSLRA acceptance of recklessness).
179. See Press v. Chemical Inves. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999) (adopting
recklessness as an adequate scienter under the PSLRA on February 4, 1999).
180. See In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d 525, 534-35 (3d Cir. 1999) (adopting recklessness as
an adequate scienter under the PSLRA on June 17, 1999).
181. See In re Comshare, Inc., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999) (adopting recklessness as an
adequate scienter under the PSLRA on July 8, 1999).
182. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974.
183. See id. (holding that plaintiffs "must plead, in great detail, facts that constitute strong
circumstantial evidence of deliberately reckless or conscious misconduct").
184. See id. at 975.

180
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1 85
recklessness with regard to Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions.
The court, however, determined that only recklessness that reflects a
form of intentional misconduct can satisfy the scienter requirement
under the PSLRA. 186 Accordingly, the Silicon Graphics court adopted
the deliberate recklessness standard, which necessitates the finding of
187
intentional or conscious behavior.

Because the PSLRA's text is silent as to the issue of recklessness, the
Ninth Circuit then examined the PSLRA's legislative history. 188 First,
the Silicon Graphics court analyzed the conference report' 89 and
concluded that Congress had intended to raise the scienter pleading
standards above that of the pre-PSLRA Second Circuit standard1 90 in
order to deter abusive securities litigation. 19 1 The court found that the
1 92
Conference Committee's deletion of the Specter Amendment
supported the argument that Congress had implicitly rejected
recklessness as a sufficient scienter. 193 Second, the Silicon Graphics
194
court determined that Congress' override of President Clinton's veto
implied that Congress had raised the scienter pleading standards above

185. See id. at 976 (citing Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990) (en
banc)); see also supra note 48 (describing the "Sundstrand standard").
186. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 975 & n.5, 976-77 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1976)).
187. See id. at 977 (holding that under the PSLRA, a plaintiff must plead facts that "create a
strong inference of, at a minimum, deliberate recklessness"). The Silicon Graphicscourt likened
the "Sundstrand standard" of recklessness to a form of knowing or intentional behavior. See id. at
976-77. In fact, the court approved of the Sixth Circuit's holding in Comshare, which adopted
the "Sundstrand standard" of recklessness, describing it as similar to conscious disregard. See id.
at 977 n.8 (citing In re Comshare, Inc., 183 F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir. 1999)).
188. See id. at 977 ("In the absence of a clear command in the text, we turn to the legislative
history for guidance" (citing Northwest Forest Resource v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 830-31 (9th
Cir. 1996))); see also 15 U.S.C.A § 78u-4(b) (West 1997).
189. The court described the conference report "as the most reliable evidence of congressional
intent." Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977 (citing Glickman, 82 F.3d at 835).
190. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (describing the pre-PSLRA Second Circuit
standard).
191. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977-78 (citing H.R. CONE. REP. No. 104-369, at 31, 41
(1995)).
192. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (describing the Specter Amendment).
193. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 978 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41
(1995)) (noting the deletion of the Specter Amendment, which codified recklessness as a
satisfactory scienter). Moreover, the court emphasized the Conference Report, which stated that
because Congress is heightening existing pleading standards, the Conference Report eliminated
language relating to recklessness. See id. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 n.23
(1995)).
194. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing President Clinton's veto of the PSLRA and the vetooverride debates).
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that of pre-PSLRA levels. 195 The Ninth Circuit decided that had
Congress intended to allow recklessness to suffice as an adequate
scienter under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, it would have expressly
provided for it in the PSLRA. 196 The court, therefore, concluded that
Congress adopted a stringent pleading standard whereby plaintiffs must
specify facts demonstrating
that the defendant acted with deliberate
97
recklessness. 1
Judge Browning dissented from the Silicon Graphics majority, urging
198
instead for the adoption of the "Sundstrand standard" of recklessness.
Judge Browning agreed with the Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits'
approaches, which asserted that Congress intended to keep recklessness
as a sufficient basis for liability. 199 First, the dissent stated that the
PSLRA's text does not support the conclusion that proof of recklessness
is no longer sufficient to meet the scienter standard. 20 0 Second,
although the dissent believed that reliance on the PSLRA's legislative
history is unnecessary because the text is unambiguous, 20 1 the dissent
analyzed the PSLRA's legislative history. 20 2 Relying on various
statements made by Congressmen during the Specter Amendment

195. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979. The Ninth Circuit determined that, because
President Clinton expressed concern that Congress heightened the pleading requirements beyond
that of the pre-PSLRA Second Circuit standard, Congress' veto-override evidenced "its intent to
elevate the pleading standard to a level beyond that in the Second Circuit." Id.
196. See id.
197. See id. (concluding that the plaintiff "must state specific facts indicating no less than a
degree of recklessness that strongly suggests actual intent"). Applying the new standard, the
court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint because, while the plaintiff stated facts
that gave "rise to some inference of fraudulent intent, her factual allegations are insufficient to
create a strong inference of deliberate recklessness." Id. at 980. The court held that the plaintiff
failed to plead corroborating facts to support the allegations in the complaint, including facts
demonstrating that the defendants knew of the company's problems at the time they made the
optimistic comments. See id. at 985.
198. See id. at 991 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
199. See id. at 991-92 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the
Silicon Graphics holding "places the Ninth Circuit at odds with both the Second and Third
Circuits").
200. See id. at 992 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent
defines recklessness utilizing the "Sundstrand standard." See id. at 992 & n.6 (Browning, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564,
1569 (9th Cir. 1990)).
201. See id. at 992 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that
"[a]ppeals to statutory history are well taken only to resolve 'statutory ambiguity"') (citing
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998)).
202. See id. at 992-93 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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elimination process 20 3 and the veto-override debates, 20 4 the dissent
concluded that the PSLRA raised the level of scienter to the pre-PSLRA
Second Circuit level, incorporating recklessness within the scienter
definition. 20 5 Third, the dissent deferred to the Security Exchange
Commission's interpretation of the PSLRA, which opined that
recklessness remains sufficient for scienter under the PSLRA.2 °6
Accordingly, the dissent admonished the Silicon Graphics majority's
standard of deliberate recklessness and7 adhered to the concept of the
20
"Sundstrand standard" of recklessness.

203. See id. at 993-94 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent
remarked that Congress discarded the Specter Amendment because "it was 'an incomplete and
inaccurate codification' of Second Circuit caselaw." Id. at 993 (Browning, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S19067 (daily ed. Dec 21, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Dodd)). Further, Senator Dodd assured supporters of the Specter Amendment that
recklessness would continue to be accepted as a sufficient scienter. See id. (Browning, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 141 CONG. REC. S19071 (daily ed. Dec. 21,
1995) (statement of Sen. Dodd)). See generally supra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing
the elimination of the Specter Amendment). The dissent concluded that the task of determining
whether recklessness suffices as an adequate scienter is "left to the courts." Silicon Graphics, 183
F.3d at 994 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204. See id. (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent notes that
during the veto-override debate, several members of Congress asserted that the PSLRA's
pleading standard "was faithful to the Second Circuit's test." Id. (Browning, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S19067 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Dodd)); see also supra Part I.B.3 (discussing the veto-override debates).
205. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 995 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (concluding that "if Congress had intended to proscribe liability for recklessness ... it
would have done so directly"). See generally supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text
(summarizing the pre-PSLRA Second Circuit scienter pleading standard).
206. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 995. (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The SEC asserted that "recklessness is 'essential to the effective functioning of Section
10(b),' and 'necessary to protect investors and the integrity of the disclosure process."' Id.
(Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Brief for Amicus SEC at 17, 2021, In re Silicon Graphics, Inc. 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999) (No. 97-16204, 97-16240)).
207. See id. at 996 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent urged
that the majority's pleading standard of deliberate recklessness is "a formulation not found in the
text of the statute, in the legislative history, or in any case heretofore litigated, and rejected by the
responsible administrative agency." Id. (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
On October 27, 1999, the Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehearing. See In re Silicon
Graphics, Inc., 195 F.3d 521, 522 (9th Cir. 1999). The dissent noted that other circuits, including
the Eleventh Circuit, had not followed the Ninth Circuit's lead in holding that recklessness is not
a sufficient scienter under the PSLRA. See id. at 523 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). The dissent
urged the Ninth Circuit to reconsider its prior ruling and reestablish recklessness as an adequate
scienter under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions. See id. at 522 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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B. The Requirementsfor PleadingScienter: Motive and Opportunity
While the circuits are split on whether recklessness satisfies the
substantive definition of scienter under the PSLRA,2 °8 they are more
deeply divided over what facts a plaintiff must allege to withstand a
motion to dismiss. 209 Specifically, the circuits disagree over whether a
plaintiff may survive a motion to dismiss by alleging facts
demonstrating that the defendant had the motive 2 10 and the
opportunity 21' to commit securities fraud. 212 The courts have developed
three different approaches: (1) the pre-PSLRA Second Circuit twopronged test; 2 13 (2) the heightened pleading standard that eliminates the
bare pleading of motive and opportunity; 214 and (3) a totality of the
2 15
circumstances approach to pleading scienter.
1. Acceptance of the Pre-PSLRA Second Circuit Approach:
Allegations of Motive and Opportunity Satisfy the Pleading Standard
The Second and Third Circuits adopted the most lenient
interpretation of the PSLRA, which accepts the Second Circuit's pre-

208. See supra Part III.A (discussing the circuit split regarding the issue of recklessness as an
adequate scienter under the PSLRA).
209. See, e.g., Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 188 (1st Cir. 1999) (concluding
that all cases should be decided on a fact specific, case-by-case basis); Bryant v. Avado Brands,
Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1287 (1 1th Cir. 1999) (concluding that, while motive and opportunity remain
relevant, the pleading of motive and opportunity alone will not suffice); Silicon Graphics, 183
F.3d at 979 (holding that the pleading of motive and opportunity alone will never withstand a
motion to dismiss); In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d 525, 534-35 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that the
pleading of motive and opportunity suffices); see also Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Circuit
Courts Begin to Coalesce on Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Standards, MONDAQ
BUSINESS BRIEFING, Dec. 1, 1999, at 4, available at 1999 WL 30590492, (stating that "[t]he
appellate courts have been more varied in their approach towards the 'procedural' aspect of the
PSLRA's mandate-the details needed in a complaint to allow a securities fraud claim to
proceed").
210. See supra note 60 (defining motive).
211. See supra note 61 (defining opportunity).
212. See, e.g., Greebel, 194 F.3d at 188 (concluding that all cases should be decided on a
totality of the circumstances basis); In re Comshare, Inc., 183 F.3d 542, 553 (6th Cir. 1999)
(holding that the pleading of motive and opportunity, while relevant, do not satisfy the pleading
burden); Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979 (holding that the pleading of motive and opportunity
alone will never withstand a motion to dismiss); Press v. Chemical Inves. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d
529, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1999) (adopting the two-pronged test).
213. See, e.g., Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d at 534-35; see also infra Part III.B.I (discussing the
two-pronged test for pleading scienter).
214. See, e.g., Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979; see also infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the
Ninth Circuit heightened pleading standard).
215. See, e.g., Greebel, 194 F.3d at 188; see also infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the totality of
the circumstances test).
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PSLRA standard for pleading scienter. 2 16 In addition, in dicta and
without discussion, the Fifth Circuit opined that the PSLRA adopted the
Second Circuit's pre-PSLRA approach.2 17 The Second Circuit standard
for pleading scienter involves a two-pronged test, wherein the plaintiff
must either (a) plead facts demonstrating that the defendant had both the
motive 2 18 and the opportunity 2 19 to commit securities fraud, or (b) plead
facts that establish strong circumstantial evidence of recklessness or
conscious misconduct. 220 If a plaintiff proceeds under the first prong of
the test, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must state
the facts with particularity demonstrating that the defendant possessed
the motive and the opportunity to engage in fraud.22 1
In Press v. Chemical Investment Services Corp.,222 the Second
Circuit adhered to the two-pronged test when it concluded that the
plaintiff satisfied the standard for pleading scienter by alleging that the
defendants had both the motive and the opportunity to commit securities
fraud.22 3 The court acknowledged that the plaintiff met the scienter

216. See Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d at 534-35; Press, 166 F.3d at 537-38; see also supra notes
57-62 and accompanying text (describing the Second Circuit's pre-PSLRA two-pronged test for
pleading scienter). Additionally, district courts in the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have adopted
the Second Circuit's two-pronged test for pleading scienter. See In re Bankamerica Corp., 78 F.
Supp. 2d 967, 990 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (holding that plaintiffs can establish scienter "by alleging
facts establishing a motive and an opportunity to commit fraud or by setting forth facts that
constitute circumstantial evidence of either reckless or conscious misbehavior"); Fugman v.
Aprogenex, Inc., 961 F. Supp. 1190, 1195 (N.D. I11. 1997) (holding that Congress intended to
adopt the Second Circuit two-pronged standard).
217. See Williams v. WMX Techs., Inc., 112 F.3d 175, 178 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing H.R. CONE.
REP. No. 369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., at 41 (1995); 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (West 1997)); see also
supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (describing the Second Circuit's pre-PSLRA twopronged test for pleading scienter).
218. See supra note 60 (defining motive).
219. See supra note 61 (defining opportunity).
220. See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534-35 (citing Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 318
n.8 (3d Cir. 1997)); Press, 166 F.3d at 538 (citing Chill v. Gen. Elec. Co., 101 F.3d 263, 267 (2d
Cir. 1996); Shields v. Citytrust Bankcorp., Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994)).
221. See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 535 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2) (West 1997)); Press, 166
F.3d at 538 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (West 1997)).
222. In Press, the plaintiff had purchased a $99,488.42 Treasury bill ("T-bill") through the
defendants, securities broker-dealers, to mature at $102,000. See Press, 166 F.3d. at 532. After
the plaintiff had purchased the T-bill, he learned that, at maturity, he would not be allowed to pick
up the proceeds immediately and the funds would either be mailed to him via regular mail or
express delivered to him for an extra charge. See id. at 533. Therefore, the plaintiff maintains
that the defendants structured this transaction so as to allow themselves more time to utilize the
funds. See id. The plaintiff then brought suit under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. See id. The
district court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint because, inter alia, the plaintiff had failed to
allege facts that create a sufficient inference of scienter. See id. at 537.
223. See id. at 538.
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pleading requirements 224 even though he had "barely alleged" facts
demonstrating motive and opportunity. 225 The Press court admitted the
Second Circuit's leniency in allowing allegations of scienter to survive
' 226
even when they are based on "tenuous inferences."
The Third Circuit, in In re Advanta Corp.,227 elaborated on the
rationale behind the conclusion that the PSLRA adopted the Second
Circuit's two-pronged test for pleading scienter. 228 After examining the
PSLRA's legislative history, the Advanta court ultimately decided that
it could not reconcile the contradictory expressions of Congress'
intent. 229 Therefore, the Third Circuit looked to the plain language of
the PSLRA, noting that the PSLRA incorporated the "strong inference"
language of the pre-PSLRA Second Circuit standard. 230 Accordingly,
the Advanta court concluded that the inclusion of pre-PSLRA Second
Circuit language clearly showed that Congress established a pleading
standard approximately equal to that of the Second Circuit prior to the
enactment of the PSLRA. 3 1
In Advanta, the Third Circuit expressly agreed with the Second
Circuit that pleading facts which demonstrate that the defendant
possessed the motive and the opportunity to commit securities fraud
remains sufficient under the PSLRA.23 2 A plaintiff, however, must state
224. See id. The court acknowledged that "this is the barest of all pleading that would be
acceptable." Id. Nonetheless, the court refused to "take this issue of fact from the finder of fact."
Id. (citing Grandon v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 147 F.3d 184, 194 (2d Cir. 1998)).
225. See id. The plaintiff pled that the defendants were motived to maintain possession of the
T-bill proceeds in order to have use of the funds. See id. Further, the plaintiff pled that the
defendants had the opportunity to use the T-bill funds as they were in the defendant's control at
maturity. See id.
226. See id. The Second Circuit declared that they "are not inclined to create a nearly
impossible pleading standard when the 'intent' of a corporation is at issue." Id.
227. See supra note 138 (summarizing the holding of Advanta). Additionally, in Advanta, the
plaintiffs alleged that several "of the individual defendants ... traded large blocks of Advanta
stock... while in possession of material, nonpublic information." In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d
525, 529 (3d Cir. 1999).
228. See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 530-35 (analyzing the applicable pleading requirements of the
Second Circuit test).
229. See id. at 533 (concluding that the legislative history, "including the President's veto
statement," is ambiguous and inconclusive and thus carries little weight).
230. See id. (noting that "the two standards are virtually identical" except for the "state with
particularity requirement").
231. See id. at 534. Moreover, the Advanta court believed that the PSLRA's inclusion of the
pre-PSLRA Second Circuit pleading standard "is consistent with Congress' stated intent of
strengthening pleading requirements and deterring frivolous securities litigation." Id.
232. See id. at 534-35 (agreeing with Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 318 n.8 (3d
Cir. 1997)); see also Press v. Chemical Inves. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999)
(adopting the motive and opportunity pleading standard); supra notes 135-37 (summarizing the
Second Circuit pleading standard).
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233
the facts demonstrating motive and opportunity with particularity.
Furthermore, these facts must create a "strong inference" that the
defendant acted with the requisite scienter. 234 Applying the twopronged test, 235 the Advanta court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint
rise to a strong
because the plaintiff failed to plead facts giving
236
inference that the defendants acted with scienter.
Although the Fourth Circuit, in Phillips v. LCI International,Inc.,237
failed to adopt a specific pleading standard, it noted the split among the
circuits regarding the pleading of scienter under the PSLRA. 238 The
Phillips court declined to adopt a pleading standard because the
239
plaintiffs had failed to meet the Second Circuit two-pronged test.
Specifically, the plaintiffs did not establish that the defendant had the
motive and the opportunity to commit securities fraud because the

233. Requiring plaintiffs to plead facts with particularity directs "plaintiffs to plead 'the who,
what, when, where, and how: the first paragraph of any newspaper story."' Advanta, 180 F.3d at
534 (quoting DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990)).
234. See id. at 535 (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2) (West 1997)). The Third Circuit warned
that "catch-all allegations that defendants stood to benefit from wrongdoing and had the
opportunity to implement a fraudulent scheme are no longer sufficient" under the PSLRA because
allowing blanket assertions would undermine the PSLRA's rigorous pleading standard. Id.
235. See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text (describing the two-pronged test for
pleading scienter).
236. See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 541; see also supra note 147 (describing the Advanta court's
conclusion that the plaintiffs had failed to meet the second prong of the two-pronged test when
they did not allege facts constituting strong circumstantial evidence of either recklessness or
conscious misbehavior). The plaintiffs alleged that the sale of company stock by several of the
individual defendants at a time when the stock price was artificially inflated indicates that the
individual defendants had the motive and the opportunity to commit securities fraud. See
Advanta, 180 F.3d at 540. The Advanta court, however, held that they "'will not infer fraudulent
intent from the mere fact that some officers sold stock."' Id. (quoting In re Burlington Coat
Factory, 114 F.3d 1410, 1424 (3d Cir. 1997)). The sale of stock might create an inference of
scienter only "if the stock sales were unusual in scope or timing." Id. (citing Burlington Coat
Factory, 114 F.3d at 1424). In Advanta, several of the individual defendants did not sell stock at
all and the defendants that did sell stock sold only "small percentages of their holdings." Id.
Additionally, the stock sales at issue were consistent with the individual defendants' prior trading
practices. See id. at 541. Accordingly, the Advanta court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint
because the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead facts with particularity that demonstrate that the
defendants possessed the motive and the opportunity to commit securities fraud. See id.
237. Phillips v. LCI Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609 (4th Cir. 1999); see also supra note 166
(summarizing the facts of Phillips).
238. See Phillips, 190 F.3d at 620-21. The court demarcated the Second and Third Circuits'
lenient two-pronged test, the Ninth Circuit's stringent approach requiring deliberate recklessness
and not allowing for the pleading of motive and opportunity, and the Sixth Circuit's middleground standard, retaining the recklessness standard but eliminating the sufficiency of merely
pleading motive and opportunity. See id.
239. See id. at 621. The Fourth Circuit described the Second Circuit two-pronged test as "the
most lenient standard possible under the PSLRA." Id.; see also supra notes 218-21 and
accompanying text (describing the two-pronged Second Circuit standard).
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allegations of motive in the complaint were tenuous and strained.2 4°
The Fourth Circuit declared that a plaintiff must support an allegation of
motive, based on benefits resulting from an increase in stock price, with
assertions that the defendant engaged in insider trading or with
assertions that the defendant sold personal stock.24 1 Therefore, although
the Fourth Circuit refused to adopt a pleading standard, the court did
elaborate on the requisite motives that a plaintiff must plead to
24 2
withstand a motion to dismiss.
2. Adoption of a Heightened Standard of Pleading: Averments of
Motive and Opportunity do not Satisfy the Pleading Standard
In In re Silicon Graphics, Inc.,243 the Ninth Circuit departed from the
Second Circuit two-pronged test, and held that facts demonstrating that
a defendant had the motive and the opportunity to commit securities
fraud are not sufficient to adequately plead scienter under the
PSLRA. 244 Determining that the PSLRA's text does not indicate
whether the pleading of motive and opportunity create a strong
inference of scienter, 245 the Ninth Circuit relied on the PSLRA's
legislative history for guidance. 246 The Silicon Graphics court, after

240. See Phillips, 190 F.3d at 621-24; see also supra note 171 (stating that the Phillips court
concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the second prong of the Second Circuit twopronged test because the allegations in the complaint did not give rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted recklessly). The plaintiffs alleged that the executive, when claiming that LCI
was not for sale, attempted to "retain a position on the corporation's board and obtain a higher
price for his stock." Phillips, 190 F.3d at 622. The Fourth Circuit declared, however, that these
motives do not suffice under the PSLRA because they pertain to all corporate mergers. See id.
241. See id. The Fourth Circuit determined that allegations that a defendant "committed fraud
in order to retain an executive position" do not suffice under the PSLRA. Id. Similarly,
"allegations that corporate officers 'were motivated to defraud the public because an inflated
stock price would increase their compensation"' do not satisfy the PSLRA pleading requirements.
Id. (quoting Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1995)).
242. See id. For example, "[t]o support a claim of motive based on the benefit a defendant
derives from an increase in the value of his holdings, a plaintiff must demonstrate some sale of
'personally-held stock' or 'insider trading' by the defendant." Id.
243. See supra note 177 (summarizing the facts of Silicon Graphics). Additionally, the
plaintiffs alleged that individual defendants "took advantage of SGI's inflated stock value by
selling" their own personal stock in the company. In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., 183 F.3d 970, 982
(9th Cir. 1999).
244. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974 (holding that "plaintiffs must state facts that come
closer to demonstrating intent, as opposed to mere motive and opportunity").
245. See id. at 977 (stating that the PSLRA's text lacks a "clear command").
246. See id.
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24 8
analyzing the PSLRA's conference report, 247 the President's veto,
249
and the veto-override,
concluded that Congress intended to heighten
the scienter pleading standard employed by the Second Circuit prior to
the enactment of the PSLRA. 250 According to the Ninth Circuit, a
plaintiff may survive a motion to dismiss only by pleading facts that
create a strong inference of deliberate recklessness or conscious
misconduct.25 1
The dissent in Silicon Graphicsargued for the adoption of the Second
Circuit two-pronged test for pleading scienter under the PSLRA.25 2
According to the dissent, the plain text of the PSLRA mandates the
inclusion of the Second Circuit two-pronged test; therefore, the majority
unnecessarily relied upon the PSLRA's legislative history. 253 The

247. See id. The Ninth Circuit discussed the purposes behind the enactment of the PSLRA,
including the goal of reducing abusive securities litigation. See id. Also, the Silicon Graphics
court analyzed Congress' deletion of the Specter Amendment, which would have codified the
Second Circuit's two-pronged test, including the ability to withstand a motion to dismiss by
pleading motive and opportunity. See id. at 978; see also supra notes 84-86 and accompanying
text (discussing the Specter Amendment). The court determined that Congress, by eliminating
the Specter Amendment, "implicitly rejected the Second Circuit's two-pronged test." Silicon
Graphics, 183 F.3d at 978 (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974)).
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the PSLRA "did not codify the Second Circuit caselaw."
Id.
248. See id. at 979; see also supra Part.Il.B.3 (describing President Clinton's veto of the
PSLRA). The Silicon Graphics court noted that President Clinton vetoed the PSLRA because of
concern that the PSLRA raised "the pleading standard above that required in the Second Circuit."
Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979.
249. See id.; see also supra Part.II.B.3 (discussing the veto-override debates). The Ninth
Circuit stated that Congress, by overriding President Clinton's veto, "provided powerful evidence
of its intent to elevate the pleading standard to a level beyond that in the Second Circuit." Silicon
Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979.
250. See id.
251. See id. The court dismissed the plaintiffs complaint because it was "too generic and
contain[ed] little more than evidence of mere motive and opportunity to commit fraud." Id. at
988. The court found that the individual defendants' stock sales did not give rise to a strong
inference of deliberate recklessness because the sales were not dramatically different from the
defendants' prior trading practices. See id. at 987. The court listed the relevant factors courts
must consider when determining whether insider trading is suspicious: "(1) the amount and
percentage of shares sold by insiders; (2) the timing of the sales; and (3) whether the sales were
consistent with the insider's prior trading history." Id. at 986. Regarding two of the individual
defendants that sold significant percentages of their total holdings, the court concluded that these
sales did not amount to suspicious insider trading because, inter alia, these defendants had not
made any of the optimistic statements. See id. at 988. Accordingly, the Silicon Graphics court
dismissed the complaint because, "[i]n the absence of greater particularity and more incriminating
facts," the court cannot distinguish the "allegations from the countless 'fishing expeditions'
which the PSLRA was designed to deter." Id. (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 37).
252. See id. at 991-92 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
253. See id. at 992 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that a
court should resort to legislative history only when the statute is ambiguous).
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dissent, however, proceeded to examine the legislative history and
concluded that Congress intended to retain the pre-PSLRA Second
Circuit's caselaw, including the ability of plaintiffs to withstand a
motion to dismiss by pleading that defendants had the motive and the
opportunity to commit securities fraud. 254 The dissent reasoned that
Congress would have expressly eliminated motive and opportunity
pleading if it had desired to heighten the pleading requirements beyond
that of the Second Circuit. 255 Accordingly, the dissent urged for the
denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss on the basis that the
plaintiffs had stated, with particularity, facts demonstrating that the
defendants possessed both the motive and the opportunity to commit
2 56
fraud.
While the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits disagree with the Ninth Circuit
on the issue of whether recklessness satisfies the scienter
requirement,25 7 they agree with the Ninth Circuit on the issue of
whether plaintiffs can satisfy the pleading standard by alleging facts
demonstrating that the defendant had both the motive and the
opportunity to commit securities fraud. 258 Both the Sixth and the
Eleventh Circuits have held that plaintiffs may not plead scienter under
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 merely by alleging facts that demonstrate

254. See id. at 993 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Browning
examined the statements of various Congressmen suggesting that the Second Circuit caselaw
remains available for guidance. See id. (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing 141 CONG. REC. S19068 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995)).
255. See id. at 993-94 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing In re
Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d 525, 534 n.8 (3d Cir. 1999)).
256. See id. at 996 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). First, the dissent
noted that the complaint alleged facts demonstrating that the defendants knew negative internal
information regarding the company while contemporaneously issuing positive public statements
regarding the company's financial condition. See id. at 1000-01 (Browning, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Second, the dissent concluded that the individual defendants' stock sales
amounted to suspicious insider trading because all of the defendants sold stock during the class
period and two of the defendants sold significant portions of their stock holdings. See id. at 1001
(Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Therefore, the dissent concluded that
the plaintiffs successfully surpassed the PSLRA's "pleading hurdle." See id. at 1002 (Browning,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
257. See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1287 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that
severe recklessness satisfies the pleading requirement); In re Comshare, Inc., 183 F.3d 542, 549
(6th Cir. 1999) (holding that recklessness satisfies the pleading standard); In re Silicon Graphics,
Inc., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that deliberate recklessness satisfies the scienter
requirement); see also supra notes 148-58, 181 and accompanying text (discussing Comshare);
supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text (discussing Bryant); supra notes 177, 189-207 and
accompanying text (discussing Silicon Graphics).
258. Plaintiffs may not survive a motion to dismiss by merely alleging facts that demonstrate
that the defendant had both the motive and the opportunity to commit securities fraud. See
Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1287; Comshare, 183 F.3d at 549; Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974.
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the defendant possessed both the motive and the opportunity to engage
in securities fraud.2 59
In In re Comshare, Inc.,260 the Sixth Circuit, relying on the PSLRA's
plain language, determined that Congress altered the pleading
requirements of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions, consistent with
26 1
Congress' purpose of deterring frivolous securities litigation.
Accordingly, the Comshare court concluded that pleading facts alleging
motive and opportunity do not alone establish a strong inference of
scienter under the PSLRA.2 62 While the Sixth Circuit noted that facts
demonstrating that the defendant possessed the motive and the
opportunity to commit fraud may be "relevant to pleading
circumstances from which a strong inference of fraudulent scienter may
be inferred," merely pleading motive and opportunity do not satisfy the
263
pleading burden.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc.,264 joined the
Ninth and Sixth Circuits in holding that allegations of the defendant's
motive and opportunity to commit securities fraud do not satisfy the

259. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1286-87; Comshare, 183 F.3d at 549.
260. See supra note 148 (summarizing the facts of Comshare). Additionally, the plaintiffs in
Comshare alleged that the individual defendants artificially inflated the stock prices in order to
sell their own personal shares at high prices. See Comshare, 183 F.3d at 547. Further, the
plaintiffs alleged that the individual defendants benefited from artificially inflating the value of
the stock because their compensation packages were related to the value of the company's stock.
See id.
261. See Comshare, 183 F.3d at 548.
262. See id. at 551. The Sixth Circuit expressly disagreed with the Third Circuit's
interpretation of pleading motive and opportunity when it declared that it "cannot agree that under
the PSLRA, plaintiffs may establish a 'strong inference' of scienter merely by alleging facts
demonstrating motive and opportunity where those facts do not simultaneously establish that the
defendant acted recklessly or knowingly." Id.
263. See id. (quoting In re Baesa, 969 F. Supp. 238, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). The Comshare
court added that while the pleading of motive and opportunity "may, on occasion, rise to the level
of creating a strong inference of reckless or knowing conduct, the bare pleading of motive and
opportunity does not, standing alone, constitute the pleading of a strong inference of scienter."
Id. Applying the pleading standard, the Comshare court examined the allegations that the
individual defendants artificially inflated the value of the company's stock in order to increase
their compensation and sell their personal stock at high prices. See id. at 553. The court declared
that, while allegations of insider trading "at unusual or suspicious levels 'is probative of motive,"'
the allegations in this complaint do not create a strong inference of recklessness. Id. (quoting
Stevelman v. Alias Research Inc., 174 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 1999)). Accordingly, the Comshare
court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint because merely pleading motive and opportunity do not
satisfy the PSLRA standard. See id.
264. See supra note 159 (summarizing the facts of Bryant). Additionally, the plaintiffs pled
that the individual defendants artificially inflated the value of the company's stock in order to sell
their own personal stock at a higher price. See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271,
1274 (11 th Cir. 1999).
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PSLRA pleading requirements. 265 The Bryant court listed three
separate reasons for concluding that Congress did not retain the motive
and opportunity test established by the Second Circuit prior to the
enactment of the PSLRA.2 66 First, the PSLRA's language does not
expressly mention nor codify the motive and opportunity test; rather it
refers to the state of mind of the defendant. 267 The Bryant court
reasoned that motive and opportunity represent types of evidence as
opposed to a state of mind.26 8 Therefore, Congress did not expressly
codify the sufficiency of pleading allegations of motive and
opportunity. 269 Second, allowing a plaintiff to withstand a motion to
dismiss based on a bare pleading that the defendant had the motive and
opportunity to commit securities fraud is inconsistent with the PSLRA's
270
purpose, namely to curb the abuses of frivolous securities litigation.
Third, prior to the enactment of the PSLRA, few circuits had adopted
the Second Circuit motive and opportunity test. 27 1 Therefore, it is
unlikely that Congress intended to codify a standard that was not well
established at the time of the PSLRA's enactment. 272 Accordingly, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the bare pleading of motive and opportunity
will not satisfy the PSLRA's pleading standard.2 73
3. The Totality of the Circumstances Approach
The First Circuit, the final circuit to address the PSLRA
issue, established a pleading standard different from the
standards of the circuits that preceded it. 274 In Greebel
Software, Inc.,275 rather than adopting any bright line rules,

pleading
pleading
v. FTP
the First

265. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1287 (requiring "particular facts that give rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted in a severely reckless manner").
266. See id. at 1285-86; see also supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text (describing the
Second Circuit's pre-PSLRA two-pronged test).
267. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1285-86; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b) (West 1997).
268. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1286.
269. See id.; see also 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b).
270. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1286.
271. See id. In fact, only two circuits, the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, had utilized
the motive and opportunity test prior to the enactment of the PSLRA. See id.
272. See id. (concluding that Congress did not intend to codify the standard).
273. See id. at 1286-87. Having announced the pleading standard, the Bryant court remanded
the case to the district court. See id. at 1287.
274. See Greebel v. FrP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 188 (1st Cir. 1999) (adopting a totality
of the circumstances approach to pleading scienter); see also supra Part.llI.B.1 (discussing the
Second Circuit two-pronged test to pleading scienter); supra Part.IlI.B.2 (discussing the approach
wherein allegations of motive and opportunity do not satisfy the PSLRA's pleading
requirements).
275. In Greebel, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant company and several of its officers
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Circuit established a fact specific, totality of the circumstances test to
determine whether the plaintiff has plead facts creating a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the requisite scienter. 276 The
Greebel court held that the PSLRA does not endorse the sufficiency
mandate of pleading motive and opportunity alone. 277 The PSLRA also
does not endorse the proposition that the pleading of motive and
opportunity never suffices to withstand a motion to dismiss. 278 Rather,
the First Circuit concluded that a court should consider all evidence
together when determining whether a plaintiff has pled sufficient facts
279
to create an inference of scienter.
First, the Greebel court concluded that the PSLRA's legislative
history was inconclusive, contradictory, and ambiguous on the issue of
whether the PSLRA codified the pre-PSLRA Second Circuit twopronged test.280 Second, the First Circuit relied on the PSLRA's text
when it declared that the words of the PSLRA do not require nor
proscribe any type of evidence, including evidence regarding motive
and opportunity. 28 1 Third, the Greebel court examined the approach the
First Circuit had taken prior to the PSLRA, stating that the First Circuit
had never adopted the Second Circuit's two-pronged test because it
preferred to analyze the particular facts on a case-by-case basis to
determine whether a plaintiff had provided a sufficient basis to support
the inference of scienter. 282 In sum, the First Circuit adopted a fact-

issued misleading, positive statements and made material omissions regarding the financial
condition of the company, thereby artificially inflating the value of the company's stock. See
Greebel, 194 F.3d at 203. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants failed to disclose threats to the
company's success and questionable sales practices. See id. at 189. Further, the complaint
alleges that several of the individual defendants took advantage of the inflated stock price and
sold portions of their holdings of the company stock. See id. at 189-90. When news became
public that the company's earnings fell, the stock price fell 70% from the class period high. See
id. at 191.
276. See id. at 188.
277. See id. at 196-97 (rejecting the Second Circuit two-pronged test).
278. See id. at 195 (rejecting the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits' approaches).
279. See id. at 196. Examples of types of evidence a court should consider include evidence
of insider trading, "closeness in time of an allegedly fraudulent statement or omission and the
later disclosure of inconsistent information," evidence of bribery, and the personal interest of
defendants in "saving their salaries or jobs." Id.
280. See id. at 191-98 (discussing the purposes behind the enactment of the PSLRA, the
Conference Report, and the veto-override). The Greebel court noted that "it would be unusual for
Congress to legislate on what fact patterns could or could not prove fraud or scienter." Id. at 195.
281. See id. (holding that the PSLRA "neither mandate[s] nor prohibit[s] the use of any
particular method to establish an inference of scienter").
282. See id. at 196. The First Circuit noted that "many different types of evidence" are
relevant to demonstrate scienter, including insider trading and the defendants' interest in saving
their positions in the company and preserving their compensation. See id. The court, however,
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specific approach wherein the courts will examine all relevant evidence
to determine whether the plaintiff has pled facts giving rise to a strong
283
inference of scienter.

IV.

ANALYSIS

The three most important considerations in determining the correct
pleading standard to apply under the PSLRA are: (1) the PSLRA's
text;284 (2) the PSLRA's legislative history; 285 and (3) the purposes and
policies behind the enactment of the PSLRA. 2 86 In respect to the
standard that satisfies the pleading requirement, the Eleventh Circuit's
"severe recklessness" standard,28 7 which is virtually identical to the
"Sundstrand standard,, 288 best complies with the text, legislative
history, and purpose of the PSLRA.2 89 Furthermore, in respect to the
requisite pleading standard for scienter under the PSLRA, the approach
taken by the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 29° best exemplifies the
goals of Congress when enacting the PSLRA.29 1 Specifically, the Sixth,
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that Congress did not intend the
bare pleading of motive and opportunity to suffice under the PSLRA.29 2

cautioned that the evidence must support a strong inference of scienter and mere blanket
assertions of motive and opportunity are insufficient. See id. at 196-97.
283. See id. at 197. Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the Greebel court
dismissed the plaintiff's complaint because the allegations did not create a sufficient inference of
scienter. See id. at 201. The court held that the individual defendants' stock sales did not occur
at suspicious times and the plaintiff did not present evidence that the sales were unusual or out of
line with prior trading practices. See id. at 206-07. Additionally, the plaintiff failed to plead facts
with particularity and instead pled general assertions. See id. at 201. Accordingly, the Greebel
court concluded that the plaintiff did not satisfy the pleading standard. See id.
284. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b) (West 1997); see also supra notes 67-70 and accompanying
text (discussing the language of the PSLRA).
285. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the PSLRA's legislative history).
286. See supra Part II.B.I (discussing the rationale behind the enactment of the PSLRA).
287. See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1283 (11 th Cir. 1999); see also supra
note 165 and accompanying text (describing the "severe recklessness" standard).
288. See supra note 48 (explaining the "Sundstrand standard").
289. See supra Part II.B (summarizing the PSLRA's text, legislative history, and rationale).
290. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1287; In re Comshare, Inc., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999); In
re Silicon Graphics, Inc., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999); see also supra Part III.B.2
(discussing the heightened pleading standard).
291. See supra Part II.B.1 (describing the rationale behind the enactment of the PSLRA).
292. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1287; Comshare, 183 F.3d at 549; Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at
974; see also supra Part Ill.B.2 (discussing the heightened pleading standard)
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A. Severe Recklessness Satisfies the Scienter Requirement
The Eleventh Circuit's "severe recklessness" standard best satisfies
the PSLRA's scienter requirements for several reasons. 293 First, the
"severe recklessness" standard complies with the PSLRA's textual
language. 294 Second, the Eleventh Circuit's "severe recklessness"
standard is consistent with the legislative history of the PSLRA.29 5
Third, allowing the "severe recklessness" standard to satisfy the
PSLRA's scienter requirement furthers the purposes behind the
enactment of the PSLRA.29 6 Finally, the "severe recklessness" standard
mirrors that of the "Sundstrand standard" of recklessness, 297 the
standard adopted by each circuit to address the issue of the requisite
level of scienter under the PSLRA.29 8 Therefore, the "severe
recklessness" standard remains faithful to the prevailing view that
Sundstrand-type recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement.
First, the "severe recklessness" standard is consistent with the text of
the PSLRA. 29 9 The PSLRA refrains from defining scienter and instead
requires a plaintiff to "state with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of
mind. '' 300 At the time of the PSLRA's enactment, every circuit court to
address the issue had held that recklessness satisfied the scienter
definition in Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions. 30 1 Additionally,
these circuits adhered to the "Sundstrand standard" of recklessness,
which defined recklessness as highly unreasonable conduct, akin to a
lesser form of intentional conduct. 30 2 When Congress drafted the
293. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing the "severe recklessness"
standard).
294. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text (describing the PSLRA's text).
295. See supra Part 11.B.2 (discussing the PSLRA's legislative history).
296. See supra Part II.B. 1 (stating the purposes behind the enactment of the PSLRA).
297. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (describing the "Sundstrand standard" of
recklessness).
298. See supra Part III.A.I (describing the acceptance of the "Sundstrand standard" of
recklessness).
299. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2) (West 1997); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d
1271, 1286 (11 th Cir. 1999) (describing the "severe recklessness" standard); see also supra notes
67-70 and accompanying text (describing the PSLRA's text).
300. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2).
301. See supra Part II.A.2 (examining the acceptance of recklessness prior to the enactment of
the PSLRA).
302. See supra Part III.A.1 (describing the circuit courts' adherence to the "Sundstrand
standard"). Moreover, the "Sundstrand standard" of recklessness complies with the Supreme
Court's definition of scienter in Hochfelder. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 19394 n.12 (1976) (defining scienter as a "mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud"). The Hochfelder court acknowledged that recklessness may be considered a form of
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PSLRA, it clearly knew of the unanimous acceptance of the
"Sundstrand standard" of recklessness. 30 3 Because Congress did not
expressly alter the scienter requirement, it left the well-accepted
standard undisturbed.3 4 Therefore, on its face, the PSLRA does
not
30 5
purport to alter the well-settled substantive definition of scienter.
Moreover, Congress' express inclusion of an actual knowledge level
of scienter in other sections of the PSLRA 306 provides support that
Congress did not mandate an actual knowledge level of scienter in the
general PSLRA text. 30 7 Congress explicitly mandated a specific,
heightened level of scienter for forward-looking statements 30 8 and for
the imposition of joint and several liability. 309 Congress, however,
declined to expressly adopt actual knowledge as the "required state of
mind" for the general imposition of liability under the PSLRA.3 1 °
Accordingly, the failure of Congress to specifically mandate actual
knowledge in the PSLRA's text supports the conclusion that the
"Sundstrand standard" of recklessness satisfies the scienter standard
under the PSLRA.3 1 1
Second, the "severe recklessness" standard 312 is consistent with the
PSLRA's legislative history. 313 While the PSLRA's legislative history
is inconsistent and inconclusive with regard to whether recklessness
satisfies the scienter requirement, the legislative history includes more
compelling evidence that Congress intended to retain the recklessness

intentional behavior. See id.
303. See 141 CONG. REC. H2863-64 (daily ed. March 8, 1995); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 15
(1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694 (acknowledging the general acceptance of the
"Sundstrand standard" of recklessness).
304. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b); see also Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 195
(1st Cir. 1999); Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1284; In re Comshare, Inc., 183 F.3d 542, 549-50 (6th Cir.
1999); In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., 183 F.3d 970, 996 (9th Cir. 1999) (Browning, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d 525, 534 (3d Cir. 1999).
305. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b); see also Greebel, 194 F.3d at 195; Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1284;
Comshare, 183 F.3d at 549.
306. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B) (West 1997) (forward-looking statements); 15
U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(f)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2000) (joint and several liability).
307. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b); see also Greebel, 194 F.3d at 194-95; Bryant, 187 F.3d at
1284; Comshare, 183 F.3d at 549.
308. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B) (forward-looking statements).
309. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(f)(2)(A) (joint and several liability).
310. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b).
311. See id.; see also Greebel, 194 F.3d at 194-95; Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1284; Comshare, 183
F.3d at 549.
312. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1286 (describing the "severe recklessness" standard).
313. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the PSLRA's legislative history).
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standard. 3 14 The House deleted an early attempt to eliminate
recklessness as a basis for liability under the PSLRA. 315 Additionally,
the Senate Report declared that Congress did not intend to "adopt a new
and untested pleading standard.- 316 Critics of the recklessness standard
find support in the elimination of the Specter Amendment 3 17 and
President Clinton's veto 3 18 of the PSLRA.3 1 9 Several members of
Congress, however, argued that the PSLRA did incorporate the
320
"Sundstrand standard" of recklessness in the PSLRA's text.
Therefore, the legislative history of the PSLRA as a whole indicates that
Congress did not eliminate recklessness as a basis for liability under the
PSLRA. 32 1
Third, allowing the "Sundstrand standard" of recklessness to satisfy
the scienter requirement furthers the purposes and policies behind the
enactment of the PSLRA.3 22 Congress enacted the PSLRA to restrict
abusive practices in securities fraud litigation, including the filing of
frivolous lawsuits in the hope of attaining settlements. 323
The
"Sundstrand standard" of recklessness is a severe form of recklessness,
closely resembling a lesser form of intent. 324 Moreover, under the
PSLRA, a plaintiff must now support allegations of scienter with facts
stated with particularity. 325 Additionally, these facts must create a
314. See supra Part II.B.2 (summarizing the PSLRA's legislative history); see also Greebel,
194 F.3d at 195; Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1284; Comshare, 183 F.3d at 549; In re Silicon Graphics,
Inc., 183 F.3d 970, 994-96 (9th Cir. 1999) (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d 525, 534-35 (3d Cir. 1999).
315. See 141 CONG. REc. H2863-64 (daily ed. March 8, 1995); see also supra notes 77-80
and accompanying text (summarizing H.R. 1058).
316. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694; see also
supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Senate Report).
317. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text (discussing the Specter Amendment).
318. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing President Clinton's veto and the veto-override debates).
319. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 978-79 (arguing that the legislative history supports the
conclusion that Congress heightened the level of scienter to deliberate recklessness or conscious
misconduct).
320. See 141 CONG. REC. H15219 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995); 141 CONG. REC. S19068 (daily
ed. Dec. 21, 1995); see also supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the veto-override debates).
321. See supra Part II.B.2 (summarizing the PSLRA's legislative history); see also Silicon
Graphics, 183 F.3d at 993-94 (Browning, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
322. See supra Part HI.B. I (discussing the rationale behind the enactment of the PSLRA); see
also In re Advanta Corp., 180 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 1999).
323. See H.R. CoNF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31-32 (1995) reprintedin 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
730-31; see also supra Part Il.B. 1 (discussing the rationale behind the enactment of the PSLRA).
324. See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 198-99 (1st Cir. 1999); Bryant v.
Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999); In re Comshare, Inc., 183 F.3d 542,
549-50 (6th Cir. 1999); see also supra note 48 (defining the "Sundstrand standard" of
recklessness).
325. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(2) (West 1997).
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strong inference of scienter. 326 Therefore, the additional procedural
requirements, combined with the condition that scienter must
encompass a severe form of recklessness, furthers the PSLRA's goals in
327
eliminating abusive, non-meritorious lawsuits.
Although the Ninth Circuit described the required state of mind as
deliberate recklessness, 328 it actually embraced the "Sundstrand
standard" of recklessness. 329 The Silicon Graphics court recognized
that the "Sundstrand standard" views recklessness as a form of
330
intentional conduct, apart from negligence and mere recklessness.
Therefore, although the Ninth Circuit appeared to heighten the requisite
level of scienter, it actually adhered to the well-accepted "Sundstrand
standard." 3 3'
In sum, each circuit to address the issue of scienter under the PSLRA
has adopted recklessness in some form. 332 Furthermore, each circuit,
including the Ninth Circuit, has applied the "Sundstrand standard" of
recklessness. 333 Therefore, while the circuits have expressed the
standards differently, a consensus has developed toward the
"Sundstrand standard" of recklessness, best served by the term "severe
' 334

recklessness."

326. See id.
327. See Greebel, 194 F.3d at 199-200; Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1284; Conshare, 183 F.3d at 549;
see also supra Part H.B.I (discussing the purposes behind the enactment of the PSLRA). Also,
the "severe recklessness" standard promotes the policy objective of protecting defrauded
investors who do not have the access to information that would enable them to adequately plead
that the defendant acted intentionally. See Advanta, 180 F.3d at 535 (stating that the inclusion of
the "Sundstrand standard" of recklessness discourages "deliberate ignorance and [it] prevent[s]
defendants from escaping liability solely because of the difficulty of proving conscious intent to
commit fraud"). "Severe recklessness" provided a balance between the lenient recklessness
standard and the stringent deliberate recklessness standard. See id.
328. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999).
329. See id. at 976; see also note 48 (describing the "Sundstrand standard" of recklessness).
330. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977.
331. See id.; see also Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, supra note 209, at 3 (noting that the Silicon
Graphics court never explained how deliberate recklessness differs from the "Sundstrand
standard" of recklessness). Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit likened their approach to the standard
adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Comshare. See Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 977 n.7.
332. See, e.g., Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1285 (severe recklessness); Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at
974 (deliberate recklessness); Advanta, 180 F.3d at 534-35 (recklessness); see also supra Part
IH.A (discussing the acceptance of recklessness as an adequate scienter under the PSLRA).
333. See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 198 (1st Cir. 1999); Phillips v. LCI
Int'l, Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 620-21 (4th Cir. 1999); Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1284; In re Comshare, Inc.,
183 F.3d 542, 550 (6th Cir. 1999); Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 976-77; Advanta, 180 F.3d at
534-35; Press v. Chemical Inves. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999); see also supra
Part II.A (discussing the circuit court's adoption of the "Sundstrand standard" of recklessness).
334. See Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, supra note 209, at 4 (observing that "the consensus in
the post-PSLRA appellate decisions is that factual pleadings giving rise to a 'strong inference' of
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B. The PSLRA Did Not Adopt the Motive and Opportunity Test
The Ninth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits correctly held that the
PSLRA did not adopt the Second Circuit's motive and opportunity
test. 335 First, the PSLRA's text reveals that Congress did not expressly
or impliedly codify the motive and opportunity standard.33 6 Second, the
legislative history of the PSLRA indicates Congress' intent to heighten
337
the scienter pleading standard beyond the level of the Second Circuit.
Additionally, President Clinton's veto of the PSLRA and Congress'
veto-override support the conclusion that the PSLRA eliminated the
Second Circuit's motive and opportunity test. 338 Finally, the adoption
of the Second Circuit's motive and opportunity standard would have
defeated the purposes underlying the enactment of the PSLRA.3 39
The PSLRA's statutory language reveals that Congress did not
attempt to explicitly or implicitly codify the Second Circuit's motive
and opportunity test.34° The text of the PSLRA does not expressly
codify or even mention the Second Circuit's motive and opportunity
standard.34 ' Instead, the express language of the PSLRA refers to the
substantive standard of scienter. 342 Therefore, the omission of the
motive and opportunity test from the PSLRA's text indicates that
Congress, when enacting the PSLRA, did not intend to adopt the
Second Circuit's motive and opportunity standard.34 3
Additionally, the PSLRA's legislative history supports the conclusion
that Congress intended to elevate the pleading standard beyond that of
the Second Circuit. 34 4 The Statement of Managers explicitly declared
that the PSLRA's goal was to strengthen the existing pleading
Sundstrand-type recklessness are sufficient to state securities fraud claims under the PSLRA").
335. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1285; Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551-53; Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d
at 979; see also Part II.B (discussing the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit's rejection of the
motive and opportunity test).
336. See supra notes 67-70 (describing the statutory language of the PSLRA).
337. See supra Part II.B.2 (summarizing the PSLRA's legislative history); see also supra
notes 57-62 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit's pleading standard).
338. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing President Clinton's veto and the veto-override).
339. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the rationale behind the enactment of the PSLRA).
340. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b) (West 1997); Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1285; Comshare, 183 F.3d
at 551; Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979; see also notes 67-70 and accompanying text
(discussing the PSLRA's text).
341. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b); see also notes 67-70 and accompanying text (discussing the
statutory language of the PSLRA).
342. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b); see also notes 67-70 and accompanying text (discussing the
PSLRA's text).
343. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b); see also Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1285.
344. See supra Part II.B.2 (summarizing the PSLRA's legislative history); see also supra
notes 57-62 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit's pleading standard).
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standard.34 5 Also, the Conference Committee deleted the Second
Circuit's motive and opportunity test from the final version of the
PSLRA. 346 The Ninth Circuit accurately noted that Congress knew of
the motive and opportunity test at the time of the PSLRA enactment, yet
declined to codify the standard.34 7 Further, as the Eleventh Circuit
recognized, at the time of the PSLRA's enactment, only two circuits had
adopted the motive and opportunity standard. 348 Therefore, Congress
did not intend to codify sub silentio a standard that was not well
34 9
accepted by the courts.
President Clinton's veto and Congress' veto-override further support
the conclusion that Congress did not incorporate the motive and
opportunity test in the PSLRA.350 The President based his veto entirely
on the notion that Congress had elevated the pleading requirements
above those of the Second Circuit. 35 1 Congress, however, without
altering the PSLRA's text, overrode the President's veto and enacted the
PSLRA into law. 352 Congress' decision to override President Clinton's
veto illustrates the Congressional intent to eliminate the Second
Circuit's motive and opportunity standard.3 5 3 Consequently, the
PSLRA's legislative history demonstrates that the PSLRA heightened
354
the scienter pleading standard beyond the level of the Second Circuit.
345. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104-369, at 41 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
740.
346. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 & n.23; see also supra notes 84-93 and
accompanying text (describing the Specter Amendment).
347. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., 183 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 1999); see also supra Part
H.B.2 (discussing the PSLRA's legislative history).
348. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1286.
349. See id. The Eleventh Circuit determined that, although Congress implicitly codified
recklessness as an actionable scienter, Congress "did not intend to codify the lesser-known,
lesser-accepted, and certainly not well-established notion that allegations of motive and
opportunity to commit fraud are sufficient to show scienter." Id.
350. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing President Clinton's veto and the veto-override debates).
351. See 141 CONG. REC. H15214 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (veto message of President
Clinton); see also supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit's
pleading standard).
352. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the veto-override debates).
353. See id.
354. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the PSLRA's legislative history); supra notes 57-62 and
accompanying text (describing the Second Circuit's pleading standard). Moreover, reliance on
the legislative history of the SLUSA is misplaced, as several members of Congress and President
Clinton attempted to create PSLRA legislative history after the fact. See supra Part II.C
(discussing the legislative history of SLUSA). "The legislative history of [SLUSA] is . . . more
an attempt to rewrite, than to clarify the legislative history of the" PSLRA. Kramer, supra note
106, at 1. As the Supreme Court noted, "the interpretation given by one Congress ... to an
earlier statute is of little assistance in discerning the meaning of that statute." Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994) (quoting Pub. Employees Retirement
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Similarly, the rationale behind the enactment of the PSLRA indicates
that Congress intended to eliminate the sufficiency of merely pleading
that the defendant had the motive and the opportunity to commit
fraud.35 5 Congress intended to limit the abuses of the securities class
action system, including the exploitation of the discovery process as a
means of attaining large settlements. 356 The low standard of allowing
the pleading of motive and opportunity to withstand a motion to dismiss
is inconsistent with the goal of deterring frivolous lawsuits.3 57 The First
Circuit's totality of the circumstances approach,35 8 like the Second
Circuit's two-pronged test, 35 9 ignores the purposes underlying the
PSLRA.36 ° Congress clearly intended to heighten the pleading standard
practices that
above that of the Second Circuit to alleviate the abusive
36 1
flourished under the prior securities class action system.
While the Ninth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits acknowledge that
allegations of motive and opportunity remain relevant under the
PSLRA,36 2 they hold that merely pleading that the defendant possessed
Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989)).
355. See supra Part H.B.1 (discussing the rationale behind the enactment of the PSLRA).
356. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing strike suits).
357. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the rationale behind the enactment of the PSLRA); see
also supra Part III.B.i (discussing the adoption of the motive and opportunity standard). The
Second Circuit, contrary to the PSLRA's purpose of heightening the scienter pleading standard,
admitted its lenience in allowing allegations based on tenuous inferences to satisfy the scienter
pleading standard. See Press v. Chemical Inves. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir. 1999).
Realistically, corporate officers often possess a motive and an opportunity to commit fraud. See
Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999). After all, "[g]reed is a
ubiquitous motive, and corporate insiders and upper management always have the opportunity to
lie and manipulate." Id. (quoting Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp.
1324, 1339 (N.D. Ga. 1998)). Motive and opportunity alone, however, do not amount to
securities fraud. See id. Additionally, companies are increasingly compensating their executives
and officers with stock options, thereby encouraging the officers and executives to engage in
routine stock sales. See Giuffra, supra note 6, at A45.
358. See Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185, 199 (1st Cir. 1999); see also supra Part
III.B.3 (discussing the totality of the circumstances approach).
359. See supra notes 217-42 and accompanying text (discussing the two-pronged test).
360. See supra Part II.B.1 (examining the rationale behind the enactment of the PSLRA).
361. See supra Part II.B.2 (describing the PSLRA's legislative history). See generally
Edward Brodsky, Circuits Split on Stock Fraud Scienter Pleading Standard, 222 N.Y.L.J. 3
(1999) (arguing that Congress intended to heighten the scienter pleading standard above that of
the Second Circuit's two-pronged standard).
362. See Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999); In re
Comshare, Inc., 183 F.3d 542, 551 (6th Cir. 1999); In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., 183 F.3d 970,
974 (9th Cir. 1999); see also supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the heightened pleading standard).
The Ninth Circuit held that allegations that the defendant had the motive and the opportunity to
commit securities fraud might "provide some reasonable inference of intent," but these
allegations do not suffice to establish a strong inference of scienter. Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at
974.
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both the motive and the opportunity to commit securities fraud does not
satisfy the PSLRA's pleading standard.3 63 Accordingly, the Ninth,
Sixth, and Eleventh Circuit's heightened pleading standard that
eliminates the Second Circuit's motive and opportunity364test is consistent
with the PSLRA's text, legislative history, and purpose.
V. PROPOSAL

Because the circuits have adopted conflicting standards regarding the
pleading of scienter under the PSLRA, uncertainty exists among
shareholders and corporations. 365 This uncertainty breeds forum
shopping among circuit courts because the outcome of a case can turn
on whether the action is filed in a circuit that has adopted a stringent
pleading standard or a circuit that has adopted a lenient pleading
standard. 366 Therefore, in order to reconcile the current circuit split, the
Supreme Court should resolve the conflict regarding scienter pleading
367
standards under the PSLRA. In light of the importance of the issues,
the Supreme Court must establish uniformity among the circuits.
When the Supreme Court does resolve the split among the circuits, it
should adopt the "severe recklessness" standard as the requisite level of
scienter under the PSLRA.36 8 Furthermore, the Supreme Court should
adopt the heightened standard of pleading whereby bare allegations that
the defendant had both the motive and the opportunity to commit
securities fraud do not satisfy the scienter standard under the PSLRA.36 9
The "severe recklessness" standard, as formulated by the Eleventh
Circuit, is consistent with the PSLRA's text, legislative history, and
rationale. 370 Because Congress clearly knew, at the time of the
PSLRA's enactment, of the predominant view that a heightened form of

363. See Bryant, 187 F.3d at 1286; Comshare, 183 F.3d at 551; Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at
974; see also supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the heightened pleading standard).
364. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the heightened pleading standard).
365. See supra Part I1l (discussing conflicting standards adopted by various circuits).
366. See Robert A. Horowitz & Karen Y. Bitar, Pleading Scienter in Securities Fraud Class
Actions, 222 N.Y. L.J. 1, 1 (1999) (stating that "there is an incentive for plaintiffs' counsel to file
their cases in the jurisdictions with the most lenient pleading requirement, currently the Second
and Third Circuits"). One commentator analogized the selection of an appropriate forum to "a
game of roulette, with the outcome turning on whether a securities class action is filed in New
York or Silicon Valley." Giuffra, supra note 6, at A45.
367. See supra Part I (discussing the significance of the scienter pleading standard).
368. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing the "severe recklessness"
standard).
369. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the heightened pleading approach).
370. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the "severe recklessness" standard); see also Bryant v.
Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1284 (11 th Cir. 1999).
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recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement, Congress' failure to
provide an explicit definition of scienter supports the conclusion that
"severe recklessness" qualifies as an adequate level of scienter under the
PSLRA. 37 1 Moreover, during the course of the PSLRA's enactment,
Congress acknowledged the acceptance of a severe form of recklessness
as an acceptable scienter standard. 372
Furthermore, "severe
recklessness" advances the PSLRA's goal of discouraging frivolous
373
lawsuits.
The "severe recklessness" standard will provide a high pleading
standard to combat abusive securities fraud litigation. 374 "Severe
recklessness" discourages the filing of strike-suits, in contrast to the
lenient standard of mere recklessness that contradicts the PSLRA's clear
purpose of heightening the scienter pleading requirements. 375 The
"severe recklessness" standard, however, will not present an
insurmountable obstacle to defrauded investors, as would the stringent
deliberate recklessness standard.3 76
"Severe recklessness" accurately describes the "Sundstrand
standard," which defines recklessness as a lesser form of intent, as
opposed to negligence or mere recklessness. 377 As courts have
consistently applied the "Sundstrand standard" of recklessness to
Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 actions, 378 the "severe recklessness"
standard faithfully adheres to a well-accepted formulation. 379 The
"severe recklessness" standard, therefore, provides the most appropriate
formulation of the scienter requirement under the PSLRA.
Additionally, the Supreme Court should adopt the heightened
standard of pleading, as proposed by the Ninth, Sixth, and Eleventh

371. See supra Part IV.A (analyzing "severe recklessness" in the context of the PSLRA's
statutory language).
372. See supra notes 312-21 and accompanying text (examining the PSLRA's legislative
history).
373. See supra notes 322-27 and accompanying text (analyzing the PSLRA's rationale).
374. See supra note 165 (describing the "severe recklessness" standard).
375. See Brad S. Karp & Daniel A. Crane, Is CircuitSplit on PSLRA Intensifying?, 222 N.Y.
L.J. S3, S3 (1999) (arguing that "[1]enient recklessness standards, including that of the Second
Circuit, are squarely at odds with the concerns addressed by Congress in the PSLRA").
376. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of the "severe
recklessness" standard); see also In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999)
(adopting a deliberate recklessness standard).
377. See supra note 165 (comparing "severe recklessness" to the "Sundstrand standard").
Moreover, "severe recklessness" conforms to the Supreme Court definition of scienter as "intent
to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
378. See supra Part III.A.I (discussing the acceptance of the "Sundstrand standard").
379. See supra note 165 (discussing the "severe recklessness" standard).

2000]

Pleading Scienter Under the PSLRA

Circuits, whereby allegations that the defendant had both the motive and
the opportunity to commit securities fraud do not suffice to adequately
plead scienter under the PSLRA.3 80 The heightened pleading standard
38
is based on the PSLRA's text, legislative history, and rationale. '
Congress refused to codify, either explicitly or implicitly, the Second
Circuit's motive and opportunity test. 382 Moreover, the PSLRA's
legislative history confirms that Congress intended to heighten the
pleading standards associated with scienter. 383 Further, Congress'
purpose in enacting the PSLRA was to heighten scienter pleading
384
standards to deter frivolous securities litigation.
Adoption of the heightened pleading standard will curtail the practice
of filing frivolous lawsuits because the courts will no longer allow a
complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss based on tenuous
inferences. 385 Both the Second Circuit's approach and the totality of the
circumstances approach ignore Congress' intentions in enacting the
PSLRA. 386 As Congress clearly intended to heighten the pleading
standard to deter frivolous litigation, lenient pleading standards conflict
387
with the goals of the PSLRA.
Under the heightened pleading standard, more detailed factual
allegations that the defendant had the motive and the opportunity to
commit securities fraud will be relevant and may create a reasonable
inference that the defendant acted with the requisite scienter. 388 The
bare pleading of motive and opportunity, however, will not create a
strong inference that the defendant possessed the necessary level of
scienter. 389 This position is consistent with the goals of the PSLRA,
balancing the need for legitimately defrauded investors to have access
to the federal courts with the need of corporations to be safeguarded
against non-meritorious claims.
380. See supra Part III.B.2 (describing the PSLRA's heightened standard of pleading); see
also Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1286 (11th Cir. 1999); In re Comshare, Inc.,
183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir. 1999); Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 974.
381. See supra Part IV.B (analyzing the heightened standard of pleading).
382. See supra notes 335-39 and accompanying text (examining the heightened standard of
pleading in light of the PSLRA's text).
383. See supra notes 344-49 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the
PSLRA).
384. See supra Part II.B. I (discussing the rationale behind the PSLRA).
385. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the heightened pleading standard).
386. See supra Part III.B.I (discussing the Second Circuit's motive and opportunity standard);
supra Part IHI.B.3 (discussing the totality of the circumstances approach).
387. See supra Part II.B. I (discussing the rationale behind the enactment of the PSLRA).
388. See In re Silicon Graphics, Inc., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999).
389. See id.
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VI. CONCLUSION

Under the PSLRA, "severe recklessness" should be adopted as the
requisite level of scienter because "severe recklessness" is consistent
with the PSLRA's text, the legislative history of the PSLRA, and the
purposes behind the enactment of the PSLRA. Also, a heightened
pleading standard should be adopted whereby allegations that the
defendant had both the motive and the opportunity to commit securities
fraud will not be sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. These
pleading standards are consistent with the rationale of the PSLRA
because they guard against frivolous litigation while allowing defrauded
investors access to the federal courts.

